Bridge equipment, navigation practices, and watchkeeping — 41 questions
Recommendations • Standard displays or display base should not be used on their own, without the additional layers required for safe navigation. • The minimum layers to be displayed for safe navigation (those other than standard display) should be included in the company SMS for different navigational conditions.
For example, a company SMS might list the following layers to be displayed: o Under any navigational condition: -IMO standard display, plus: -Depth soundings and contours. -Wrecks, obstructions and danger marks. o Additionally, when anchoring: -Submarine cables and pipelines. -Seabed characteristics. -Anchorage identification. • The company SMS should detail the procedure for customising ECDIS display layers for various navigation situations, watch handover procedures and Master’s standing orders. • Full display should be switched on when the vessel is due to breach the limiting boundaries of the XTC, the safety contour, the manual safety contour, or whenever the risk of missing navigational data could jeopardise safer navigation.
Navigating officers should be aware that switching on all layers will lead to excessive data cluttering on the ECDIS.
In this case, bridge manning levels should be increased, and the Master should be called immediately. • Navigating Officers should be familiar with ECDIS symbols and how they differ from symbols on traditional paper c harts. 4.2.8 Look -ahead zone The look ahead zone, also referred to as the safety frame, anti -grounding cone or look -ahead time, angle or width, needs to be set correctly, taking into account factors that include vessel speed, proximity to navigational hazards, availability of sea room, traffic concentration, geographical limitations and manoeuvrability.
Correctly setting the look - ahead zone and associated alarms enables the system to generate warnings or alarms in case of navigational hazards.
This feature does not provide alarms for radars, ARPA, AIS targets or for navigational hazards on Raster Navigational Charts (RNCs).
Recommendations • The parameters for the look -ahead zone should be planned so that the size of the zone is appropriate for the vessel’s sp eed and manoeuvring characteristics.
They should be set for each leg of the passage and should consider conditions such as proceeding from ocean to coastal wates, pilotage areas or speed. • The look -ahead zone should be reassessed in CATZOC areas that have reduced position accuracy (such as B, C, D, U) to ensure the vessel has sufficient safety margin… • The look -ahead zone should be highlighted on the display. 5 Alarm management For Navigating Officers and the bridge team, proper alarm management is very impor tant.
Alarm functionality can vary from one make to another.
Some ECDIS systems allow the operator to disable alarm sounds, thus downgrading to a visual indication only. 5.4 Recommendations • Alarm setting parameters should be agreed by the Master and Bridge team at the passage planning stage and captured in the relevant passage plan form. • The criteria for setting alarms, warnings and cautions should be decided on board the vessel in accordance with the company SMS procedures for various navigational conditions. • The alarms should be set to assist the Master and officers in maintaining their awareness and understanding of potential dangers to the vessel in a manner that reduces alarm fatigue. • Once the alarm settings are determined this should be clearly communicated to all navigating officers. • Alarms should not be physically or routinely disabled. • If an alarm is to be disabled for any reason, this should be recorded on a formal tracking form to be handed over to subsequent watches and approved by the Master. • Before acknowledging the alarm, Masters and Officers should always understand and confirm the type of alarm.
The habit of acknowledging alarms for the purpose of eliminating noise and disturbance shall be avoided.
The bridge team should review the alarm log on a regular basis to make sure that critical alarms have not been inadvertently overlooked.
Chapter 4.13 Electronic Chart Display and Information System Checklist B5 ECDIS Setup.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requir es that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include • Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
Where a vessel is fitted with an ECDIS, the vessel operator should have developed procedures, which include appropriate checklists, to ensure that the unit(s) are operated and managed in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and industry best practice.
The procedures should address: • Display management. • Alarm management. • Creating and uploading passage plans. • Changing passage plans. • Recalling previous voyages. • Route checking. • Plotting manual fixes (visual bearing and radar range). • Creating parallel index lines. • Setting safety depths and safety contours as appropriate to the draught of the vessel. • Setting of safety frame/safety cone. • AIS and or radar overlay, if fitted. • Limitations of operating in RCDS mode. • SCAMIN and how it is displayed. • CATZOCs and how the information should be used in operation. • Contingency action in case of single or multiple ECDIS failure. • Updating software in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions.
The vessel operator should indicate whether ECDIS is the primary means of navigation through the pre-inspection questionnaire.
The information provided will be inserted in the inspection editor and the final report.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for ECDIS operation and management.', 'Review the company procedures to verify that the required safety settings meet industry standards.', 'Review the setup of an ECDIS unit with the accompanying officer and verify that settings, alarms and displays were in accordance with the provided checklists and quick reference guides.', 'Review the alarm history, if available, and identify whether alarms were being generated that should have been addressed through proper set up and passage planning.', 'Review navigational records and confirm that there was a process in place to verify the ECDIS settings and record the outcome periodically throughout the voyage.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures that defined how ECDIS units should be operated and managed.', 'ECDIS checklists and quick reference guides.', 'Records to demonstrate that software updates had been completed in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions.', 'Records to demonstrate periodic tests required by the manufacturer’s instructions had been completed.', 'Records to demonstrate that the ECDIS settings had been checked periodically during each voyage.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition. 2.4.9 Maritime Safety Information Weather information (including gale warnings), NAVAREA warnings and coastal navigational warnings are broadcast by radio-telephony from coast radio stations and by NAVTEX.
Long range weather warnings are broadcast via satellite communications systems, such as SafetyNET, along with NAVAREA navigational warnings as part of the World-Wide Navigational Warning Service (WWNWS).
Details of weather routeing services for ships and information for shipping are contained in lists of radio signals and in Volume D of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Publication No 9. 3.15.3 Maritime Safety Information A continuous MSI watch should be kept at sea at all times by all ships.
NAVTEX should be used to meet this requirement whilst the ship is within range of a coast station broadcasting NAVTEX.
Beyond this range, a watch should be kept on the appropriate MF or HF frequencies or on the ship earth station (SES) in order to receive MSI.
IMO: MSC.1/Circ. 1310/Rev.1 Revised Joint IMO/IHO/WMO Manual on Maritime Safety Information (MSI). 2.3 Broadcast methods 2.3.1 Two principal methods are used for broadcasting maritime safety information in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, in the areas covered by these methods, as follows: .1 NAVTEX: broadcasts to coastal waters; and .2 SafetyNET: broadcasts which cover all the waters of the globe except for Sea Area A4, as defined by IMO resolution A.801(19), annex 3, as amended.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter IV Regulation 12 .2 Every ship, while at sea, shall maintain a radio watch for broadcasts of maritime safety information on the appropriate frequency or frequencies on which such information is broadcast for the area in which the ship is navigating.
IMO: MSC.1/Circ. 13 10/Rev.1 Revised Joint IMO/IHO/WMO Manual on Maritime Safety Information (MSI).
The vessel operator should have developed a procedure to require that the Marine Safety Information received through the NAVTEX and SafetyNet systems is promptly reviewed and, where appropriate, applied to the voyage charts and passage planning documentation.
The procedure should define the process for: • Setting up the NAVTEX and SafetyNET EGC receivers to receive Marine Safety Information broadcasts applicabl e to the vessel’s location and route. • Reviewing incoming messages and transferring pertinent information to the passage charts and documentation. • Where information is transferred directly from NAVTEX to an ECDIS unit the process for identifying warnings that will affect the vessel’s route. • Filing, retaining and disposing of Marine Safety Information broadcasts. • Removing Marine Safety Information from electronic and paper charts once the warning has expired or is cancelled.
Industry Guidance: ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.8 Voyage Date Recorder. 4.8.3 Preserving Records VDR and S -VDR recordings provide important information for marine accident investigators.
All watchkeeping officers should be familiar with the procedures for preventing these records being overwritten. 4.8.4 VDR Testing The system should include functions to carry out a performance test at any time.
Testing is required annually and should always be carried out following repair or maintenance work to the VDR or to any source providing data to the VDR.
This test may be conducted using the playback equipment and should ensure that all the required data items are being correctly recorded.
OCIMF: Recommendations on the Proactive Use of Voyage Data Recorder Information (revised edition August 2020). 3.2 Data not being recorded Typically, the VDR data is only examined following an incident or accident.
As a result, when an incident does happen, it is not uncommon to find that the VDR was not fully operational at the time of the incident and some or all data was not recorded correc tly. procedures are regularly reviewed and updated.
The procedures are updated to reflect new legislation, technology and updated industry standards .
Examples may include: • ECDIS and VDR including data recovery.
IMO: ISM Code 8.3 The SMS should provide for measures ensuring that the Company’s organization can respond at any time to hazards, accidents and emergency situations involving its ships.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 20 Voyage data recorders 1 To assist in casualty investigations, ships, when engaged on international voyages, subject to the provisions of regulation 1.4, shall be fitted with a Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) as follows: .4 sh ips, other than passenger ships, of 3,000 gross tonnage and upwards constructed on or after 1 July 2002. (Cargo ships built prior to 1July 2002 shall be fitted with a VDR which may be a simplified voyage data recorder (S - VDR)) IMO: Resolution MSC.333(90) A doption of Revised Performance Standards for Shipborne Voyage Data Recorders (VDRs) 2 Recommends Governments to ensure that VDRs: .1 if installed on or after 1 July 2014, conform to performance standards not inferior to those specified in the annex to the present resolution; and .2 if installed before 1 July 2014, conform to performance standards not inferior to those specified in the annex to resolution A.861(20), as amended by resolution MSC.214(81). 5.4.3 Recording should be continuous unless terminated in accordance with
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.3 Compass Systems 4.3.2 Gyro compass The gyro compass should be run continuously.
Should a gyro compass stop for any reason, it should be restarted and subsequently regularly checked and only relied on again when it has “settled” and the error is known.
Where the gyro has no direct speed log or position input, manual corrections should be made as required.
The gyro will usually support a number of repeaters, including a required repeater at the emergency steering position.
Gyro repeaters on the bridge should be checked against the main gyro at least once per watch and after significant manoeuvring.
Other repeaters should be checked frequently. 4.3.3 GNSS compass A Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) compass provides an alternative to a gyro compass as a non -magnetic transmitting heading device able to provide heading data to AIS, radar and automatic plotting aids.
A GNSS compass or equivalent is required on ships navigating in Polar Waters at latitudes above 80 degrees. 4.3.4 Compass errors As a safeguard against any wandering from the correct heading going undetected, gyro and gyro repeater headings should be frequently checked.
Magnetic and gyro compass errors should be checked and recorded each watch, where possible, using either azimuth or transit bearings.
A deviation card for the magnetic compass should be maintained and be available to the Bridge Team.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place. • Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 2.1 All ships irrespective of size, shall have: 2.1.1 a properly adjusted standard magnetic compass, or other means, independent of any power supply, to determine the ship’s heading and display the reading at the main steering position. 2.2 All ships of 150 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size shall, in addition to the requirements of paragraph 2.1, be fitted with: 2.2.1 a spare magnetic compass, interchangeable with the magnetic compass as referred to in paragraph 2.1.1, or other means to perform the function referred to in paragraph 2.1.1 by means of replacement or duplicate equipment. 2.3 All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size shall, in addition to meeting the requirements of paragraph 2.2, be fitted with: 2.3.5 a properly adjusted transmitting heading device, or other means, to transmit heading information for input to the equipment referred to in paragraphs 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.4. ( radar, elect ronic plotting aid and AIS ) 2.5 All ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards shall….have: 2.5.1 a gyro-compass, or other means, to determine and display their heading by shipborne non-magnetic means, being clearly readable by the helmsman at the main steering position.
These means shall also transmit heading information for input to the equipment referred to in paragraphs 2.3.2, 2.4 and 2.5.5 ( radar, electronic plotting aid and AIS).
The vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that: • Standard magnetic, gyro and GNSS compasses carried onboard are properly maintained and serviced. • Heading information for each compass is frequently checked through terrestrial, celestial and/or comparative observation. • Frequent checks are made for heading accuracy output to all navigational equipment. • A record of error for each compass is maintained • An up to date deviation card is available on the bridge for the standard magnetic compass. • The standard magnetic compass is adjusted when; o the deviation consistently exceeds a defined value, o becomes unreliable, o suffers damage, o records of compass error have not been maintained over the preceding two years.
['management as applicable.', 'Inspect the various compasses and repeaters and verify that the heading output is consistent, and illumination is functional.', 'Review the deviation card and compass error records and verify that the company expectation for compass adjustment had been complied with.', 'Review the service records for the gyro compass(s) and verify that servicing had been carried out in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures for standard, gyro and GNSS compass management', 'The standard compass adjustment and residual deviation certificate.', 'Compass error records.', 'Service records for the gyro compass(s).
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Section 3.15 GMDSS watchkeeping 3.15.1 Radio watchkeeping The OOW is responsible for ensuring compliance with the ship’s watchkeeping requirements.
Section 3.12.2 Risk of Collision Due to the risk of confusion and error, VHF radio and AIS should not be relied on for collision avoidance.
OCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals.
Sixth Edition. 4.13.2.2 Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency equipment Permanently and correctly installed VHF and UHF equipment are safe to use when the tanker is at the terminal, but it is recommended that the transmission is set to low power (one watt or less).
The use of portable VHF/UHF radios in a terminal or on board a tanker presents no hazards if the equipment is certified and kept intrinsically safe and the power output is one watt or less.
The use of VHF/UHF radio equipment as a means of communication between tanker and terminal personnel is recommended.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter IV Regulation 7 1 Every ship shall be provided with : .1 a VHF radio installation capable of transmitting and receiving ; .1 DSC on the frequency 156.525 MHz(channel 70).
It shall be possible to initiate the transmission of dist ress alerts on channel 70 from the position from which the ship is normally navigated ; and .2 radiotelephony on the frequencies 156.300 MHz (channel 6), 156.650 MHz (channel 13) and 156.800 MHz (channel 16) ; .2 a radio installation capable of maintaining a continuous DSC watch on VHF channel 70 which may be separate from, or combined with, that required by subparagraph .1.1 ; IMO: MSC.131 (75) Maintenance of a continuous listening watch on VHF channel 16 by SOLAS ships whilst at sea… 1 Determines, having regard to SOLAS regulation IV/12.3, that every ship while at sea, shall continue to maintain, where practical, continuous listening watch on VHF channel 16, until such time as the Maritime Safety Committee may determine the cessation of this requirement… IMO: Resolution A.954 (23).
Proper use of VHF Channels at Sea
The vessel operator should have developed procedures which define how the VHF/DSC equipment fitted to the vessel will be used, operated and tested.
These procedures may includ e: • The VHF frequencies and/or channels that must be monitored on a continuous basis while the vessel is at sea and/or at anchor. • The periodic checks and tests to be carried out to verify that the VHF/DSC equipment is fully functional. • The record- keeping requirements for the routine and emergency use of the VHF/DSC equipment. • The company expectations regarding radio etiquette when using the VHF/DSC equipment. • The use of VHF and compliance with the International Regulations for Preventing Col lisions at Sea (COLREG). • The need to identify any VHF units not connected to the Voyage Data Recorder and any restrictions on their use for critical communications.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the use and operation of the VHF/DSC equipment fitted to the vessel.', 'Review the records for the testing of the VHF/DSC equipment and verify that the equipment was tested and found functional in accordance with company expectations. appropriate VHF channels were being monitored and records were being maintained of all significant communications as defined by the company procedure.', 'Review th e data inputs to the VHF/DSC equipment and verify that the static data was correctly programmed, and the dynamic data was being correctly received from external feeds.', 'Interview the accompanying navigation officer to verify their understanding of the com pany procedure and Master’s standing orders relating to the use of VHF radio in collision avoidance situations.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures for the use and operation of the VHF/DSC equipment fitted to the vessel.', 'The GMDSS Radio Log Book or other records which documented which VHF channels were being monitored and details of significant communications.', 'The Master’s standing orders.', 'Checklists that demonstrated that periodic checks and tests required to be carried out on the communications equipment, including VHF/DSC units had been completed as required by the company procedures.', 'Where the vessel was fitted with multiple VHF units which were not all connected to the VDR, clear identification of the units not connected, with instructions on their use for significant communications.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 3.12 Compliance with the COLREGs.
The conduct of a ship’s navigation should always comply with the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).
This includes displaying correct lights and shapes and making the correct sound and light signals.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 2.2 All ships of 150 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size shall, in addition to the requirements of paragraph 2.1, be fitted with: .2 a daylight signalling lamp, or other means, to communicate by light during day and night using an energy source of electrical power not solely dependent upon the ship’s power supply.
IMO: Resolution MSC.95(72) Performance Standards for Daylight Signalling Lamps. 8 Back -up and fall -back arrangements Each daylight signalling lamp should be provided with at least three spare illuminants ( i.e., bulbs ) complying with the type-tested illuminant.
Page 175 of 711 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library : Part 1 Version 1.0 (January 2022)
The vessel operator should have developed navigational procedures which define: • The company expectations for preventing the risk of collision and the means at the disposal of the navigation officer to attract the attention of another vessel in accordance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. • The checks and tests required to be undertaken to ensure all navigation equipment is available for immediate use including the daylight signalling lamp and its battery.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the procedure which defined the company expectations when attracting the attention of another vessel in a collision avoidance situation.', 'Review that bridge equipment testing records and verify that the daylight signalling lamp had been periodically tested in accordance with company expectations.', 'Test the daylight signalling lamp on both battery and mains power and verify that the unit is fully functional.', 'Check the availability of spare bulbs and verify that at least three spare bulbs are available that comply with the manufacturer’s specifications.
Expected Evidence', 'The procedure which defined the company expectations for the use and testing of the daylight signalling lamp.', 'The bridge equipment testing records demonstrating that periodic tests had been carried out for the daylight signalling lamp.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Section 3.12 Compliance with the COLREGS.
The conduct of a ship’s navigation should always comply with the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).
This includes displaying correct lights and shapes and making the correct sound and light signals.
Checklist B13 – Restricted Visibility.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires t hat comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: Navigating in heavy weather/restricted visibility/ice.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: COLREG Part D -Sound and Light Signals.
Rule 33 Equipment for sound signals • A vessel of 12m or more in length shall be provided with a whistle, a vessel of 20 m or more in length shall be provided with a bell in addition to a whistle, and a vessel of 100 m or more in length shall, in addition, be provided with a gong, the tone and sound of which cannot be confused with that of the bell.
The whistle, bell and gong shall comply with the specifications in annex III to these Regulations.
The bell or gong or both may sounding of the required signals shall always be possible. (Annex III Technical details of sound signal appliances.)
The vessel operator should have developed procedures to define: • The expected use of the vessel’s sound signalling equipment to comply with the COLREGs in or near an area of restricted visibility, during collision avoidance and while manoeuvring. • The Bridge Log Book entries or checklists that will be used to confirm that sound signalling equipment was used in compliance with the COLREGs and company expectations during restricted visibility. • The periodic tests required to be conducted to verify the effectiveness of the sound signalling equipment, including automation, provided to the vessel.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defined the expected use and testing of the sound signalling equipment fitted to the vessel.', 'Review the bridge equipment testing rec ords and verify that periodic tests had been completed to confirm the functionality of whistles, bells and gongs and, their automation, to conform to the requirements of the COLREGs.', 'Review the Bridge Log Book and/or checklists for restricted visibility (B PG checklist B13 or equivalent) to identify any recent period of restricted visibility whilst the vessel was underway or at anchor and verify that sound signals were recorded as being sounded as required by the COLREGs.
The inspector will only be required to look back through records for the previous month to confirm that sound signals had been made during restricted visibility.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures which defined the expectations for the use and testing of sound signalling equipment fitted to the vessel.', 'Bridge Log Book.', 'Completed bridge checklists including restricted visibility and bridge equipment testing.
The accompanying officer should be ready to show the inspector the evidence for the previous three occasions where the sound signalling equipment was used during restricted visibility.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance: ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.11 Radar and Radar Plotting Aids.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.
IMO: ISM Code 7.The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 Carriage requirements for shipborne navigational systems and equipment
SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 requires the following: (2.3.2) all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards, a 9 GHz radar. (2.5.5) all ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards, an automatic tracking aid Administration, a second 9GHz radar. (2.7.2) all ships of 3,000 gross tonnage and upwards, a second automatic tracking aid (2.8.1) all ships of 10,000 gross tonnage and upwards, an automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA), or other means, to automatically plot the range and bearing of at least 20 other targets, connected to a device to indicate speed and distance through the water, to determine collision risk and simulate trial manoeuvre.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the management and operation of the radar and ARPA units fitted to the vessel.
The procedures should define: • When the radar/ARPA units are required to be in operation. • When and how periodic performance checks are to be carried out and recorded. • The required settings of ARPA audible and visual alarms and warnings for Closest Point of Approach (CPA) and Bow Crossing Range (BCR) where fitted. • The required ARPA speed and heading input f or collision avoidance purposes. • The process for parallel indexing set -up and use – particularly for complex passages with multiple sets of indexes. • The use of the ARPA trial manoeuvre function. • The danger of displaying AIS data (vectors) on ARPA units for collision avoidance purposes. • The effect of blind sectors and clutter suppression on the radar performance. • Restrictions in the use of radar during cargo operations. • The planned interval for changing the magnetron in 3 GHz and 9 GHz radars.
The inspector should be aware of terminal/operational restrictions controlling the operation of the radar units during the inspection.
The operator/vessel staff should establish what functionality can be demonstrated while the radar units are on standby, particularly as it relates to the pre-programming of parallel indexing.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for managing and operating the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel.', 'Where possible, review the ARPA alarm settings for CPA ,and BCR where fitted, and verify that they were set in accordance with company procedures with the audible and visual alarms functioning.', 'Where possible, review the process for programming individual, and sets of parallel index lines into the radar and compare with the inbound passage plan to verify that the parallel indexing was used as indicated by the passage plan.', 'Review onboard records and verify that the radars/ARPAs were in operation in accordance with company procedures and performance checks were conducted as required with satisfactory results.', 'Review the heading, speed and positional inputs to each radar and/or ARPA and verify that the information was consistent with the master equipment.', 'Review the radar maintenance records and verify that the magnetrons for each radar had been changed in accordance with the required schedule.', 'Verify that the accompanying navigation officer was aware of the difference in performance between X', 'band (9 GHz) and S', 'band (3 GHz) radars, particularly the impact of environmental conditions on the performance of each type.
Expected Evidence', 'Any checklists or quick reference charts for the operation of the radar/ARPA units fitted to the vessel.', 'Onboard records demonstrating that the radar/ARPA units had been in operation and tested in accordance with company procedures.', 'Information relating to any blind sectors affecting the fitted radars.', 'Onboard records relating to the routine changing of the magnetrons for each radar fitted.', 'The parallel index information used for programming the radars for the previous passage.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance: ICS Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.2 Steering Gear and Automatic Pilot.
Annex 3 Checklists Section B – Bridge B1 Steering Gear Test Routines USCG: Code of Federal Regulations.
Title 33. § 164.25 Tests before entering or getting underway. (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section no person may cause a vessel to enter into or get underway on the navigable waters of the United States unless no more than 12 hours before entering or getting underway, the following equipment has been tested: (1) Pri mary and secondary steering gear.
The test procedure includes a visual inspection of the steering gear and its connecting linkage, and, where applicable, the operation of the following: (i) Each remote steering gear control system. (ii) Each steering posit ion located on the navigating bridge. (iii) The main steering gear from the alternative power supply, if installed. (iv) Each rudder angle indicator in relation to the actual position of the rudder. (vi) Each remote steering gear power unit failure alarm. (vii) The full movement of the rudder to the required capabilities of the steering gear.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Actions upon equipment failure. • Supporting checklists.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 24 Use of Heading and/or Track Control Systems.
Regulation 25 Operation of Steering Gear.
Regulation 26 Steering Gear: Testing and Drills. 1 Within 12 hours before departure, the ship's steering gear shall be checked and tested by the ship's crew.
The test procedure shall include, where applicable, the operation of the following: .1 the main steering gear; .2 the auxiliary steering gear; .3 the remote steering gear control systems; .4 the steering positions located on the navigation bridge; .5 the emergency power supply; .6 the rudder angle indicators in relation to the actual position of the rudder; .7 the remote steering gear control system power failure alarms; .8 the steering gear power unit failure alarms; and .9 automatic isolating arrangements and other automatic equipment. 2 The checks and tests shall include: .1 the full movement of the rudder according to the required capabilities of the steering gear; .3 the operation of the means of communication between the navigation bridge and steering gear compartment 3.1 Simple operating instructions with a block diagram showing the change-over procedures for remote steering gear control systems and steering gear power units shall be permanently displayed on the navigation bridge and in the steering compartment . 3.2 All ships' officers concerned with the operation and/or maintenance of steering gear shall be familiar with the operation of the steering systems fitted on the ship and with the procedures for changing from one system to another.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the onboard management of the steering gear and control systems, which provided guidance on the following: • The steering modes available for use which may include; o automatic steering. o track steering. o hand steering. o remote conning position steering. o non-follow up steering. • Changing between the steering modes available. • Limitations of and any restrictions imposed on any mode of steering. (speed, rudder limit, location etc.) • The testing of steering control systems and power units prior to departure, prior to arrival and periodically during the voyage. • Changing from one steering control system to another in the event of an alarm or failure. • Actions required on the bridge to engage/permit remote em ergency steering.
['Sight, and where required review, the company procedure for managing, testing and operating the steering control systems provided.', 'Review the records for the testing of the steering control systems provided and verify that all steering modes had been tested from each location, as appropriate, in accordance with the company procedure.', 'Confirm that the procedure for changing over steering control systems and operating the emergency steering system were available and posted on the bridge, including the block diagram required.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures for managing, testing and operating the steering control systems provided.', 'The vessel specific procedures for changing between steering control modes and systems.', 'The vessel specific procedure for changing over to emergency steering control.', 'The block diagram showing the change', 'over procedures for remote steering gear control systems and steering gear power units.', 'Records for a recent voyage to demonstrate that steering control system tests had been completed in accordance with company procedures.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.10 Automatic Identification System It is important that AIS is operated correctly and that watchkeepers are familiar with the equipment, including how to check that all information being transmitted by AIS is both accurate and updated.
Poor quality broadcast data can significantly reduce the potential value of this system.
IMO: Resolution A.1106(29) Revised Guidelines for the Onboard Operational use of Ship borne Automatic Identification Systems (AIS).
Operation of the transceiver unit Activation 22 AIS should always be in operation when ships are underway or at anchor.
If the master believes that the continual operation of AIS might compromise the safety or security of his/her ship or where security incidents are imminent, the AIS may be switched off.
Unless it would further compromise the safety or security, if the ship is operating in a mandatory ship reporting system, the master should report this action and the reason for doing so to the competent authority.
Actions of this nature should always be recorded in the ship's logbook together with the reason for doing so.
The master should however restart the AIS as soon as the source of danger has disappeared.
If the AIS is shut down, static data and voyage-related information remains stored.
Restart is done by switching on the power to the AIS unit.
Ship's own data will be transmitted after a two- minute initialization period.
In ports AIS operation should be in accordance with port requirements.
Use of AIS in collision avoidance situations such a device in due time. 41 Nevertheless, AIS inform ation may merely be used to assist in collision avoidance decision -making.
When using the AIS in the ship-to -ship mode for anti- collision purposes, the following cautionary points should be borne in mind: .1 AIS is an additional source of navigational inf ormation.
It does not replace, but supports, navigational systems such as radar target -tracking and VTS; and .2 the use of AIS does not negate the responsibility of the OOW to comply at all times with the Collision Regulations, particularly rule 7 when determining whether risk of collisions exists. 42 The user should not rely on AIS as the sole information system but should make use of all safety -relevant information available. 43 The use of AIS on board ship is not intended to have any special impact on the composition of the navigational watch, which should continue to be determined in accordance with the STCW Convention. 44 Once a ship has been detected, AIS can assist in tracking it as a target.
By monitoring the information broadcast by that target, its actions can also be monitored.
Many of the problems common to tracking targets by radar, namely clutter, target swap as ships pass close by and target loss following a fast manoeuvre, do not affect AIS.
AIS can also assist in the identification of targets, by name or call sign and by ship type and navigational status.
OCIMF/ICS: International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals.
Sixth Edition 4.13.4 Automatic Identification Systems The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is required to operate while a tanker is underway and at anchor.
Some port authorities may ask for the AIS to be kept on when a tanker is alongside.
The AIS operates on a VHF frequency and transmits and receives information automatically, and the output power ranges between 2.0W and 12.5W.
Automatic polling by another station, e.g. by port authority equipment or another tanker, could cause equipment to transmit at the higher (12.5W) level, even when it is set to low power (typically 2.0W).
When alongside a terminal or port area where hydrocarbon gases may be present, either the AIS should be switched off or the aerial isolated and the AIS given a dummy load.
Isolating the aerial preserves manually inputted data that may be lost if the AIS is switched off.
If necessary, the port authority should be informed.
When alongside a terminal or port area where no hydrocarbon gases are likely to be present, and if the unit has the facility, the AIS should be switched to low power.
At a Single Point Mooring (SPM) or Multi -Buoy Mooring (MBM), th e AIS may be kept on, if requested by the terminal, at an adequate power level to transmit information to the terminal safety monitoring system.
Tanker and terminal representatives should agree on the AIS settings.
If the AIS is switched off or isolated while alongside, it must be reactivated on leaving the berth.
The use of AIS equipment may affect the security of the tanker or the terminal at which it is berthed.
The use of AIS may be determined by the port authority, depending on the security level in the port.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.
IMO: ISM Code shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 2.4 All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size shall be fitted with an automat ic identification system (AIS)…:
The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the effective onboard management of navigation equipment, including Automatic Identification Systems (AIS).
The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation and testing of the AIS which include guidance on: • AIS configuration. • Static and dynamic data input. • Periodic checks and performance tests. • The use of AIS data during collision avoidance. • Limitations for operating the unit during cargo operations. • Switching the unit on and off.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation and testing of the AIS equipment fitted onboard.', 'Review checklists and records to verify that testing of the AIS system had been carried out in accordance with the company procedure.', 'Verify that the navigational data feeds provided to the AIS were consistent with the output from the master equipment for heading, speed and position.', 'Confirm that the vessel static data was correctly entered in the unit.', 'Determine whether AIS data was transferred to the ARPA for display and verify that the vessel operator provided guidance relating to the use of AIS data for collision avoidance.
Expect e d Evidence', 'The company procedure for the operation and testing of the AIS equipment fitted onboard.', 'Records of the checks and performance tests required to be carried out on the AIS equipment fitted.', 'Company guidance related to the use of AIS information in collision avoidance situations.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 3.5 Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System The Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) should be in operation whenever the ship is at sea, including when the ship’s heading or track control system is in use.
The OOW should ensure that the BNWAS is operational and set correctly in accordance with the SMS and the Master’s Standing orders.
TMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place.
These procedures may include: • Use of BNWAS.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 2.2 All ships of 150 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size shall, i n addition to the requirements of paragraph 2.1, be fitted with: .3 a bridge navigational watch alarm system (BNWAS)… The bridge navigational watch alarm system shall be in operation whenever the ship is underway at sea. 4.1.3 Reset function 4.1.3.1 It should not be possible to initiate the reset function or cancel any audible alarm from any device, equipment or system not physically located in areas of the bridge providing proper look out. 4.1.3.2 The reset function should, by a single operator action, cancel the visual indication and all audible alarms and initiate a further dormant period.
If the reset function is activated before the end of the dormant period, the period should be re- initiated to run for its full duration from the time of the reset. 4.1.3.3 To initiate the reset function, an input representing a single operator action by the OOW is required.
This input may be generated by reset devices forming an integral part of the BNWAS or by external inputs from other equipment capable of registering physical activity and mental alertness of the OOW.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures to define: • When the BNWAS is required to be in operation. • Who will activate the BNWAS and the process for doing so. • How the system will be protected from unauthorised deactivation. • What to do if a BNWAS stage 2 or 3 alarm is activated. • The periodic tests and checks required to verify correct functioning of the BNWAS.
It is an OCIMF expectation that the BNWAS shall be activated at anchor in addition to while the vessel is at sea.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for operating and testing the Bridge Navigation Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) fitted to the vessel.', 'Review vessel records and verify that the BNWAS had been operated and tested in accordance with company procedure.', 'Request that the process for activating and deactivating the BNWAS is described or demonstrated.', 'Verify that any tests required to confirm proper functioning of the BNWAS were understood by the accompanying officer.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures for the use and testing of the BNWAS.', 'Bridge Log Book.', 'Bridge checklists.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.9 Electronic Position Fixing Systems 4.9.3 GNSS receivers Whether as stand-alone equipment or as part of an integrated system, GN SS receivers provide: • Position (including service quality information and geodetic datum corrections); • Ground referenced course and speed; and • Route storage and cross track distance (XTD) monitoring.
By entering the passage plan into the GNSS receiver, the OOW has an independent method of monitoring the passage.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 2.1 All ships, irrespective of size, shall have: for use at all times throughout the intended voyage to establish and update the ship’s position by automatic means.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the effective onboard management of navigation equipment, including Global Navigation Satellite System receivers.
The procedure should define: • The configuration of the equipment. • The periodic checks and performance tests to be conducted. • Where more than one receiver is fitted, the process to switch the output from one receiver to another. • The periodic checks to verify that all equipment is receiving an accurate positional input. • The actions to take in the event of a single GNSS receiver failure. • The actions to take in the event of multiple GNSS receiver failures.
Sugges t ed Inspector Actions • Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver operation and management • Review the configuration of the GNSS receivers and verify that the settings were in accordance with the company procedures. • Verify that the antenna offset data was available and had been correctly entered in the GNSS receiver configuration. • Verify that the GNSS receiver(s) had been set to WGS84 datum. • Review onboard records to confirm that periodic checks and tests required to be carried out to the GNSS receivers had been completed as required. • Verify that the GNSS position feed to two or more navigational systems was correct. • Verify that onboard instructions were posted for any GNSS receiver output inter -switch arrangements.
Expected Evidence • The company procedure that defined how GNSS units should be operated and managed • Onboard records to demonstrate that the required checks and tests had been completed • The measurements to allow the checking / reprogramming of the antenna offset position in the GNSS receiver configuration.
Potential Grounds for a
Industry Guidance: ICS Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.5 Echo Sounders The echo sounder should always be used when making a landfall and kept switched on in coastal and pilotage waters.
If the echo sounder is fitted with a shallow water alarm, the alarm sho uld be set to an appropriate safe depth to warn of approaching shallow water.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks sho uld be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 2.3 All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size, shall in addition to the requirements of paragraph 2.2 be fitted with: .1 an ech o-sounding device, or other electronic means, to measure and display the available depth of water;
or other electronic means to measure the depth of water, and the associated means to record depth history.
The procedure should define: • When the echo sounder is required to be in operation. • Where forward and aft transducers were fitted to the vessel, considerations for the set up a nd display of information. • When the echo sounder recording device was required to be operational and any time/position marking necessary. • Where a separate printer was provided, the times the printer is required to be recording. • The criteria for the setting of the depth alarm – where fitted. • The requirements for periodic checks to confirm the proper functioning and accuracy of the echo sounder when compared to water of a known depth.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for managing and operating the echo sounder and its associated recording device(s).', 'Review a recent passage and verify that the echo sounder and its recording device were in use in accordance with company procedures.', 'Review the depth alarm setting and verify that it was in accordance with company procedures for the time of the inspection or while manoeuvring to the berth.', 'Review onboard records and confirm that the accuracy of the echo sounder had been confirmed by periodic comparison in accordance with company procedures.', 'Request that the accompanying navigation officer demonstrate that the echo sounder is showing the expected depth indication under the keel at the time of the inspection.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures for managing and operating the echo sounder and its associated recording device.', 'Onboard records demonstrating that the echo sounder and its recording device were in operation as required by the company procedures.', 'Onboard records demonstrating that the accuracy of the echo sounder had been verified.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.4.2 Types of Speed Log.
Electromagnetic and doppler type logs can be either single- axis and measure speed in the fore and aft direction (longitudinal) or dual -axis and measure fore and aft (longitudinal) and also athwartships (transverse) movement.
When connected to rate of turn data, dual -axis logs are also able to calculate the speed and direction of movement of the bow and stern.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 (Ships constructed on or after 1 July 2002) 2.3 All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size, shall in addition to the requirements of paragraph 2.2 be fitted with: .4 speed and distance measuring device, or other means, to indicate speed and distance through the water. have: .2 a speed and distance measuring device, or other means, to indicate speed and distance over the ground in the forward and athwartships direction. (Ships constructed before 01 July 2002 but after 01 September 1984 and over 500 gross tonnage shall have a speed and distance indicator when engaged on international voyages .)
The vessel operator should have developed procedures, taking into account manufacturer’s instructions, which defined: • The periodic checks to verify the functionality of the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to the vessel. • The periodic checks to verify that the speed output to remote displays and navigational equipment, such as ARPA, AIS and ECDIS, is accurate. • The speed input(s) required to be used for navigational equipment such as ARPA, AIS and ECDIS.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation and testing of the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to the vessel.', 'Verify that the speed outputs from the speed and distance measuring devices were being correctly displayed at each remote display.', 'Verify that the water speed displayed by the ARPA & ECDIS units was consistent with the output from the water speed log.', 'Where a dual axis doppler log was fitted, verify that the ground speed displayed by the ECDIS units was consistent with output from the dual axis log.', 'Verify that function and performance checks required by the company procedures had been completed as required.', 'Verify that operational verification checks for the speed input to ARPA, AIS and ECDIS had been completed as required by the company procedures.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures for the operation and testing of the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to the vessel.', 'Records of the periodic accuracy and function tests for the speed and distance measuring devices fitted to the vessel.', 'Records of periodic verification that the speed input to navigational equipment such as ARPA, AIS and ECDIS was accurate.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.7 Navigation Lights and Signalling Equipment The OOW is responsible for ensuring that the navigation lights, emergency navigation lights and signalling equipment are in working order and are ready for immediate use at all times.
The condition of lights, flags and shapes should be checked at regular intervals.
Checklists B3, B6, B7 & B16.
IMO: Resolution MSC.253(83) Adoption of the performance standards for navigation lights, navigation light controllers and associated equipment. 4.3 Special requirements for lights using LEDs The luminous intensity of LEDs gradually decreases while the electricity consumption remains unchanged.
The rate of decrease of luminous intensity depends on the output of LEDs and t emperatures of LEDs.
To prevent shortage of luminous intensity of LEDs: .1 An alarm function should be activated to notify the Officer of the Watch that the luminous intensity of the light reduces below the level required by COLREGs; or .2 LEDs should on ly be used within the lifespan (practical term of validity) specified by the manufacturer to maintain the necessary luminous intensity of LEDs.
The lifespan of LEDs should be determined and clearly notified by the manufacturer based on the appropriate test results on the decrease of luminous intensity of the LEDs under various temperature conditions and on the temperature condition of LEDs in the light during operation, taking the appropriate margin into account. operational.
IMO: ISM Code 10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the Company.
IMO: COLREG Part C.
Lights and Shapes.
Annex 1.
Positioning and technical details of lights and shapes.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures to define the periodic checks and tests that are required to be carried out on the navigation lights, the navigation light controller and navigational shapes.
The checks should include: • Primary and secondary navigation lights are fully operational. • Primary and secondary power supplies to the navigational light controller are operational. • Power supply failure alarm is operational. • Where LED lamps are fitted, they are within their usable lifespan for luminous intensity.
This may be achieved by inte grated luminous intensity or usage monitoring systems with alarms or by manual recording of usage. • Adequate spare lamps are onboard meeting the navigation light manufacturer’s specification for luminosity, or wattage, and focal plane. • Required navigational shapes are onboard and in good condition. (three balls, one cylinder & one diamond) • Portable navigation lights, where required to be carried, are in good working order and fitted with the necessary lanyards to permit hoisting.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which defined the checks and tests that were required to be carried out on the navigation lights, navigation light controller and navigational shapes.', 'Review the pre', 'departure, pre', 'arrival and daily navigational checklists and verify that navigation light checks and tests had been completed as required by the company procedures.', 'Request that the navigation officer demonstrates the functionality of the navigation light controller and navigation lights .', 'Review the inventory of spare navigation light lamps and verify that they conform to the manufacturer’s specification and luminosity for each navigation light fitted to the vessel.', 'Review the method of ensuring LED lamps, if fitted, are within their usable lifespan for luminous intensity.', 'Where possible, and safe to do so from the deck of the vessel, sight individual navigational lights and verify that the screens, lamps and lenses were in apparent good condition.', 'Sight the navigational shapes and verify that they were in good condition.', 'Sight the portable navigation lights, where carried, and verify that they were in good condition and functioning.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures which defined the checks and tests required to be carried out on the navigation lights, navigation light controller and navigational shapes. portable), navigation light controller and navigational shapes had been completed as required.', 'The inventory of spare navigational lamps identifying the luminosity or wattage and the navigation lights to which they may be fitted.', 'Records of LED lamp usage and lifespan, where required.
Potential Grounds for a Ne g ative Observation', 'There was no company procedure defining the checks and tests required to be carried out on the navigational lights, the navigational light controller and navigational shapes.', 'The accompanying navigation officer was unfamiliar with the company procedure for conducting checks and tests on the navigation lights, the navigation light controller or navigational shapes.', 'The navigation lights and navigation light controller had not been tested in accordance with the company procedure.', 'The navigation lights or navigation light controller were defective in any respect. (a single bulb failure on a single light would not generate an observation).', 'Navigation lights or their screens were damaged, relocated or obscured in such a way that the required spacing and/or arc of visibility of any lights was apparently no longer in compliance with COLREG Annex 1 requirements.', 'The required navigational shapes were not onboard or were in an unusable condition.', 'Portable navigation lights, where required to be carried, were defective or not ready for rigging.', 'The vessel did not have an inventory of spare lamps for each type and luminosity of navigation light fitted.', 'The inventory of spare lamps did not conform to the navigation light manufacturer’s specifications. (incorrect size, focal plane, luminosity, wattage or type).', 'Procedures did not include guidance on the use of LED lamps, where fitted.', 'There was no effective method of ensuring LED lamps were within their usable lifespan for luminous intensity', 'LED lamps were in use beyond the lifespan specified by the manufacturer or were in an alarm condition for reduced luminous intensity.
Page 161 of 711 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library : Part 1 Version 1.0 (January 2022)']
In general, • LNG vessels are fitted with two cargo pumps on each tank. • LNG membrane vessels are equipped with an emergency cargo pump that can be installed in the tank if both cargo pumps were to fail. • LNG Moss vessels are not provided with an emergency cargo pump; if both cargo pumps were to fail, any remaining cargo would be transferred to another tank by pressurising the vapour space above the liquid.
This operation may require the resetting of the cargo tank relief valves to compensate for the increase in pressure from the normal set pressure. • Fully and semi -pressurised LPG Carriers use the compressors for emergency discharge operations.
Where an emergency cargo pump is provided, procedures should include guidance on: • Preparing and installing the emergency cargo pump. • Operating the emergency cargo pump. • Storing the emergency cargo pump. • Inspection and testing of the emergency cargo pump.
Where emergency transfer is achieved by pressurisation, procedures should include guidance on: • Resetting the cargo tank relief valves, where necessary.
Where emergency transfer is achieved through other means such as eductors, procedures should include guidance on: • The drive medium for the eductors and avoiding contamination between cargo grades.
['Sight, and where necessary review the company procedures for carrying out emergency discharge operations.
Page 248 of 579 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 2 – Version 1.0 (January 2022)', 'Verify that the accompanying officer is familiar with the company procedures for carrying out emergency discharge operations.', 'Where an emergency cargo pump is provided: o Inspect the emergency cargo pump where possible. o Verify that inspections and tests had been conducted in accordance with company procedures.
Expected Evidence', 'Company procedures for carrying out emergency discharge operations.', 'Where carried, the inspection and testing records for the emergency cargo pump.
Potential Grounds for a']
Maintenance tasks may include: • Periodic removal of the installed orifice plates and piping end caps and flushing any debris from the system. • Cleaning the in-line filters. • Back flushing the system with fresh water.
['Inspect the space(s) containing the remote controls for the water', 'spray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck.', 'Review the operating instructions for the system posted in the space(s) and verify that the system valves and controls are properly marked and set.', 'Review inspection and servicing data available in the space(s).', 'Inspect the system piping, particularly on the underside, for external indications of corrosion and for patching.', 'Examine a random sample of nozzles for evidence of clogging by debris.', 'Request an accompanying crew member to randomly check the isolating valves and stop valves to verify they are operating freely.', 'If necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out contained in the maintenance plan.', 'Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the water spray system with reference to: o Starting the pumps. o The purpose and location of the isolating valves and stop valves. o The purpose and location of the drain point for the deck piping.
Page 501 of 579 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library Part 2 – Version 1.0 (January 2022) Exp ected Evidence', 'The vessel’s maintenance plan for vessel’s fire protection systems and fire', 'fighting systems and appliances.', 'The records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out on the water', 'spray system for cooling and fire prevention on deck Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance OCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents.
First Edition. 4.2.2 Berth-to-berth passage plan The IMO Assembly resolution A.893(21) Guidelines for Voyage Planning includes appraisal (gathering all information relevant to the voyage or passage); detailed planning of the whole voyage or passage from berth to berth, including the areas where a pilot is needed; execution of the pan; and monitoring the vessel’s progress during implementation of the plan.
When it comes to making berth-to -berth passage plans, the principles of passage planning are broadly similar to those followed when using paper charts.
Recommendations • If the destination has not been confirmed, passage should be planned from berth to a point the vessel is expected to sail towards.
All sections of the passage must be properly planned and validated on ECDIS before executing a route. 4.3 Route validation Route validation involves the following stages: • Visual checks • Manual and auto- validation features. • Cross -checks by the bridge team. • Re-validation along the route. 4.3.1 Recommendations • Route validation should be conducted before every voyage. • Route validation should be conducted by at least the Navigating Officer and the Master, using both visual checks and route validation functions within ECDIS. • Alarms, cau tions and indications should be appropriately checked and actioned.
Those that cannot be resolved and that affect the passage plan should be discussed with the Master. • The route validation procedure should be defined in the company SMS. • The Master should only authorise the plan once all stages of visual checks and route validation have been completed. • The Company SMS should define the procedure for recording the Navigating Officer’s route validation and the Master’s passage plan authorisation. • Route re- validation should be undertaken by the Navigating Officer after any subsequent route changes, ENC updates, software/hardware, navigational warning changes.
Once complete the Master should check and then re-authorise the plan. • The company SMS should include the procedure for post -voyage review, so that any hazards or useful information can be incorporated in future passage plans. 4.4 Route execution and monitoring Route execution and monitoring stages occur after the passage plan has been finalised and after the route validation stage is complete, including the latest supplementary information, before passage begins.
This involves configuring all ECDIS, including displays, safety contour and safety depth settings and look -ahead zones, uploading manual layers, and managing overlays, according to the authorised passage plan. 4.4.2 Position verification and monitoring It is critical that the navigator is constantly aware of the vessel’s position and its accuracy.
The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is the s tandard source of position data for ECDIS, but navigators must always be aware of its limitations.
The vessel’s position on ECDIS can be verified using a combination of techniques that include: • Radar Image Overlay (RIO). • Visual or radar bearings. • Radar range and bearings. • Parallel indexing. • Celestial observations. • Depth comparison using an echo sounder.
Recommendations • The company SMS should define the frequency of, and preferred methods for, position verification while using ECDIS. • A combination of techniques should be used, including RIO, radar/visual fixes, parallel indexing and celestial navigation, as per the company SMS. • Regular and frequent position verification should help to safeguard against GNSS errors, as well as jamming and spoofing. • Parallel indexing should be used on radars as opposed to the ECDIS. • Masters and Bridge Officers should be aware that hardware or software used discrepancies might arise on an ECDIS, and they should use traditional position-fixing and navigational techniques to cross- check navigational information.
ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 2.1 Principles The purpose of passage planning is to develop a comprehensive navigation plan for the safe conduct of the ship from berth to berth.
The plan for the intended passage should identify a route which: • Recognises hazards and assesses associated risks and decision points. • Ensures that sufficient sea room and depth of water is available. • Includes appropriate position fixing opport unities. • Complies with relevant reporting requirements and routeing measures for ships. • Takes into account anticipated traffic and weather conditions. • Complies with all applicable environmental protection measures.
Checklist B9 Passage Planning.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include • Berth to berth passage planning. • Supporting checklists.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 34 Safe navigation and avoidance of dangerous situations 1.
Prior to proceeding to sea, the Master shall ensure that the intended voyage has been planned using the appropriate nautical charts and nautical publications for the area concerned, taking into account the guidelines and recommendations developed by the Organization*. 2.
The voyage plan shall identify a route which: 1. takes into account any relevant ships’ routeing systems; 2. ensures sufficient sea room for safe passage of the ship throughout the voyage; 3. anticipates all known navigational hazards and adverse weather conditions; and 4. takes into account the marine environmental protection measures that apply, and avoids, as far as possible, actions and activities which could cause damage to the environment. *Refer to Guidelines for Voyage Planning (resolution A.893(21)).
The vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that onboard staff appraise, plan, execute and monitor all passages from berth to berth in accordance with international/local rules and industry best practice.
The procedures should define: but not be limited to: o Parallel indexing (not from floating objects unless they have first been checked for position). o Chart changes. o Methods and frequency of position fixing and/or position verification. o Prominent navigation and radar marks. o No-go areas. o Landfall targets and lights. o Clearing lines and bearings. o Transits, heading marks and leading lines. o Significant tides or current. o Safe speed and necessary speed alterations. o Changes in machinery space status, i.e. manned/unmanned. o Changes in machinery status, i.e. standby for manoeuvring. o Changes in bridge watch composition. o Changes to fuel and/or scrubber use. o Changes in security arrangements. o Minimum under keel clearance. o Positions where the echo sounder should be activated. o Crossing and high- density traffic areas. o Safe distance off navigational hazards or marks . o Anchor clearance. o Contingency plans. o Abort positions. o VTS and reporting points, etc. o Air draught when passing under bridges/power lines/cable cars etc. o Alternative or contingency routing that may be required at short notice. o Specific guidance provided by local routing publications where applicable to the vessel and its route. • The process to verify that all navigational and environmental considerations have been included in the final passage plan. • The review and approval process for a passage plan including utilising the ECDIS route checking function. • The record keeping requirements as they relate to the progress of the passage and navigational events. • The actions to take to update the passage plan when circumstances change requiring the vessel to deviate from the originally agreed plan. • The requirement for preparing the passage plan on both paper charts and ECDIS where the vessel has a single ECDIS unit or has nominated paper charts as the primary means of navigation. • The requirement for a passage plan briefing including the Master, all navigation officers and a representative from the engineering department.
A vessel should be expected to deviate from the planned passage to the extent necessary to safely comply with the collision regulations.
Due consideration should be given to such when appraising the passage and developing the plan to ensure that there is adequate sea room, and the watch conditions are appropriate.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company passage planning procedure.', 'Sight, and where necessary review, the company record keeping procedures as they relate to navigational activities.', 'Review a recent passage plan and verify that it was in the format defined by the company passage planning procedure and contained, as a minimum, the information identified by the company procedure.', 'Review the same passage plan on the paper and/or electronic charts and verify that the information required to be displayed in accordance with the company passage planning procedure had been included.', 'Review the records for the same passage and verify that the records maintained contained the information required to be recorded in accordance with the company passage planning procedure.', 'Verify that where two ECDIS units are fitted, both units had been loaded with the passage plan.', 'Verify that route checking and scanning had been carried out utilising the ECDIS route checking function or in the case of paper charts, manually, prior to commencing a voyage and at any time changes had been made to the approved plan. the engineering department prior to commencing a voyage or, prior to each significant portion of a voyage.
When reviewing the frequency of manually applied position fixing on an ECDIS equipped vessel, be guided by the frequency defined by the vessel operator within their navigation procedures.
Expected Evidence', 'The company passage planning procedures.', 'The company record keeping procedures relating to navigational activities.', 'The company passage plan appraisal form / checklist for a recently completed voyage.', 'The passage plan for a recently completed voyage approved by the Master and signed by the navigation officers.', 'The ECDIS passage planning station and/or paper charts showing the reviewed passage plan and monitoring history.', 'The Bridge Log Book, movement book and other records documenting the progress of the voyage.
Potential Grounds for a Negat i ve Observation', 'There were no company passage planning procedures.', 'There were no company record keeping procedures relating to navigational activities.', 'The accompanying navigation officer was not familiar with the company passage planning or navigational record keeping procedures.', 'There was no standard passage planning form which required the passage plan to be documented in a consistent manner, capturing all data identified within the procedures.', 'There was no passage plan appraisal form / checklist to verify that all information pertinent to the passage had been considered.', 'The passage was planned or executed in clear contravention to collision regulations, company navigation procedures or guidance provided on the charts, routing guides or sailing directions.', 'The charted passage plan did not include all pertinent information required to be displayed in accordance with the company procedures.', 'The passage plan was not reviewed and approved in accordance with company procedures.', 'Route checking and scanning had not been conducted prior to commencing a voyage or when a planned voyage had been changed or updated.', 'The passage plan was not substantially followed, such as passing an island or navigational mark on the unplanned side, unless the passage plan identified alternative routes for contingency use.', 'The vessel’s position was not manually fixed in accordance with company navigational procedures and the planned position fixing method and interval.', 'Records of the progress of a voyage had not been maintained in accordance with company procedures.
Page 183 of 711 – SIRE 2.0 Question Library : Part 1 Version 1.0 (January 2022)']
The vessel operator should have developed an under keel clearance (UKC) policy and procedure which defined: • The minimum dynamic UKC required to be maintained; o During open sea passage. o During coastal / restricted waters passage. o Within port limits. o While alongside. o While at SBM/CBM berths. o At anchor. • The factors to be considered when calculating and evaluating UKC, which should include; o The predicted height of the tide. o Changes in the predicted tidal height, which may be caused by wind speed and direction and/or high or low barometric pressure. o Nature and stability of the bottom e.g. sand waves, siltation etc. o Accuracy of hydrographic data, (references to reliability are often included on charts or in the form of CATZOC on ENCs). o Change of water density and the corresponding increase in draught. o The vessel's size and handling characteristics and the increase in draught due to heel. o Wave response allowance, which is the vertical displacement of the hull due to heave, roll and pitch motions. sagging. o Reduced depths over pipelines and other obstructions. o The predicted increase in draught due to squat. (Squat information relevant to the vessel for both loaded and ballast passages should be readily available on the bridge.) • When UKC calculations are to be completed. • The method of calculating and documenting the calculations performed. • Where the results of the UKC calculations must be communicated, e.g., Master/pilot information exchange. • Where the results of the UKC calculations shall be used, i .e.
ECDIS depth or echo sounder alarm settings. • The need to update UKC calculations to reflect the new predicted time of passing over critical hydrographic features where a passage is delayed. • The actions to be taken when the required UKC could not be maintained at all stages of a planned voyage. • The required action where an external party requires an UKC in excess of the company requirement.
The vessel operator should have declared the required minimum required UKC applicable to the vessel within the pre-inspection questionnaire.
This information will be inserted in inspection editor and the final report.
['Review the company under keel clearance (UKC) policy and procedure and verify that the values uploaded to the pre', 'inspection questionnaire were accurate.', 'Review the UKC calculations for a recent voyage and verify that all factors required to be considered by the company procedure had been included in the calculation and evaluation and that the resulting UKC compli ed with company expectations.', 'Review the voyage records, including echo sounder printer or electronic records, for the same voyage and verify that the calculations were completed for the time that the vessel passed over the critical hydrographic features.', 'Review a recent Master/Pilot information exchange checklist and verify that the UKC information had been recorded in accordance with company expectations.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedure that defined the company under keel clearance (UKC) policy and the requirement for conducting calculations and recording the results.', 'The passage planning documentation for recent voyages.', 'The UKC calculation documentation to support recent voyages.', 'Master/Pilot information exchange documentation which included the supporting UKC calculations.', 'Bridge Log Books, bell books, echo sounder records and charted passage history to permit verification of the time of passing critical hydrographic features.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guida nce ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition. 1.3.2.1 Master’s Standing Orders Lines of authority on board should be in accordance with the SMS and operational procedures manuals.
The Master should explain particular requirements to the Bridge Team in Master’s Standing Orders.
These orders should be drafted to support the SMS.
Company and Master’s Standing orders should be read by all Bridge Team members upon joining the ship, signed and dated.
A copy of the orders should be available on the bridge for r eference. 1.3.2.2 Bridge Order Book In addition to Master’s Standing orders, specific instructions will be needed.
At least at daily intervals, the Master should write in the Bridge Order Book what is expected of the OOW for that period.
These orders should be signed by each OOW when taking over a watch, to confirm that they have read, understood and will comply with the orders.
The OOW should brief other members of the Bridge Team, as appropriate, on any particular activities or requirements for the forthcoming watch.
TMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place.
These procedures may include: • Calling the Master.
IMO: ISM Code 5.1 The Company should clearly define and document the master’s responsibility with regard to: IMO: STCW Code Part A Chapter VIII – Watchkeeping Taking over the watch 22 Relieving officers shall personally satisfy themselves regarding the: .1 standing orders and other special instructions of the master relating to navigation of the ship;
The vessel operator should have developed a procedure which required the Master to issue Master’s Standing Orders, giving guidance on the mandatory and desirable content.
The Master’s Standing Orders should be prepared and signed by the Master upon appointment to the vessel and signed for understanding by each navigation officer when they join the vessel and before undertaking their first nav igation duties.
The orders, as written, should reference company navigational procedures and identify any circumstances where the Master wishes his instructions to be stricter than the company requirement documented within the SMS.
The content should include, but not be limited to: • Defining restricted visibility and the actions to be taken by the officer of the watch upon encountering it. • Defining the minimum Closest Point of Approach (CPA) and Bow Crossing Range (BCR) acceptable during normal* navigational watches and the actions to be taken if these cannot be maintained. • The minimum passing distance to navigational dangers and/or navigational aids during normal* navigational watches and the actions to be taken if these cannot be maintained. • Defining how the alarms and layers for use with ECDIS/ECS are required to be set, checked and in what circumstances they may be changed. • The hazards and limitations of reliance on AIS and VHF in collision avoidance situations. • Calling the Master. • The process of the Master taking over the con of the vessel. *Normal navigational watches are when the Master or his deputy, as defined by the company, are not required to be on the bridge as part of the official bridge team composition.
The SMS procedures should require supplementary orders to be issued by the Master each day in a Bridge Order Book to cover periods when the Master may be resting or otherwise engaged.
The daily orders should also be used to give additional instruction relevant to the operation of the vessel in the short term and prior to the next time the Master expects to be present or to provide further instructions.
These orders should be signed by each OOW when taking over a watch, to confirm that they have read, understood and will comply with the orders.
Sugge sted Inspector Actions • Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the requirement for the Master to prepare Master's Standing Orders and Daily Orders • Review the Master’s Standing Orders and verify that: o They included the content defined by the company procedure. o They defined what constituted restricted visibility. o They defined the minimum CPA and BCR permitted during normal* navigational watches. o They defined the minimum passing distance from navigational dangers and / or navigational hazards during normal* navigational watches. o They defined how the alarms and layers for use with ECDIS/ECS are required to be set and checked, and in what circumstances they can be changed. avoidance situations. o They defined the circumstances in which the Master must be called. o They defined the process by which the Master would take over the con on the vessel. o They had been signed and dated by the existing Master upon being assigned to the vessel, or at later revision. o They had been signed by each navigation officer on joining the vessel and before taking any navigational duties. • Review the Bridge Order Book and verify that: o Entries had been made by the Master at least daily. o Information was entered which was consistent with the operation and voyage of the vessel such as preparations for approaching critical areas due to piracy concerns, fishing vessel activity, increased traffic density or expected d eteriorations in weather conditions. o Each entry had been dated, timed and signed by the Master. o The entries had been signed for understanding by each navigation officer prior to taking their watch.
Expected Evidence • The company procedure defining the requirement for the Master to develop their own Standing and Daily Orders. • The Master’s Standing Orders signed by the Master and all navigation officers. • The Bridge Order Book with each dated and timed entry signed by the Master, and subsequently, each OOW befo re taking over their watch.
Potential Grounds for a
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.12.
Charts and Nautical Publications.
Only up to date official charts and publications should be used for appraisal, planning, execution and monitoring of a passage plan. 4.12.3 Electronic Charts Users of electronic charts should be aware that: • ENC and RNC are official charts produced by a hydrographic office; and • All other commercially available alternatives are unofficial or private charts. 4.13.2 Chart Updates Procedures for updating ENCs and RNCs should be included in the SMS.
Chart updates should be controlled and monitored using the on-board chart management system.
IHO: Information on IHO Standards related to ENC and ECDIS (Ver 2.1 Feb 2020) IHO Advice for PSC Inspectors concerning IHO Standards ii) use up to date electronic navigational charts (ENC); Hydrographic Authorities are required to keep nautical charts up to date to include all information considered to be relevant to safety of navigation (including temporary or preliminary information); and as such regularly issue updates to their ENCs.
For an ECDIS to be used for navigation it must have the correct up to date ENCs for the intended available for an ENC as issued by the Hydrographic Authority has been applied to the SENC.
There are currently two chart distribution services an international mariner can sign up to for delivery of ENCs (noting there are also several national distribution services for mariners operating exclusively in national waters). 1) Standard subscription - ENC permits are purchased for a known operating area for a fixed periods of time (3 to 12 months).
This enables the decryption of these ENCs in ECDIS and enables their use for planning and navigation. 2) Pay As You Sail (PAYS) – Mariners pay a minimal planning fee for upfront use of the entire global ENC data set.
A tracking service is fitted to the vessel and as they navigate across ENCs they are charged accordingly.
PAYS services can give instant access to most ENC chart across the globe.
To facilitate PSC inspections and to assist mariners in satisfying themselves that their ENC data is “up to date” S -63 was updated to Edition 1.2, adding an additional annex covering the ENC Status Report.
Only ECDIS type approved according to Edition 4.0 of IEC 61174 will be capable of displaying the report.
The report is a concise and standardized format designed for two individual use cases: a) To ensure that all ENC cells loaded into the ECDIS SENC are up to date for the next leg of a particular route; and b) To ensure that all ENCs loaded into the SENC are up to date.
UKHO: Guide to ECDIS audits and inspections.
ECDIS audit checklist • 8.
Are official electronic charts (ENC/RNC) being used? • 9.
Are the electronic charts in use up-to -date (latest edition and updates)? • 10.
Are T&P NMs being used correctly in voyage planning and monitoring? • 11.
Is the ADMIRALTY Information Overlay (AIO) in use? • 12.
Has Weekly Notice to Mariners Section VIII and the README.TXT file been consulted?
See also Explanatory notes and references (representative only as other Hydrographic Organizations and electronic chart suppliers exist) OCIMF: Recommendations on Usage of ECDIS and Preventing Incidents.
First Edition. 4.2.4 Temporary and Preliminary Notices to Mariners, ENC Preliminary Notices to Mariners and Admiralty Information Overlay.
Not all ENC producers include Temporary and Preliminary Notices to Mariners (T&P NMs) as part of their ENC updates.
The UKHO provides a list of countries that include T&P NMs in their ENCs.
In cases where T&P NMs are not included in local ENCs, T&P NMs issued for admiralty paper charts are available through a service called Admiralty Infor mation Overlay (AIO).
AIO displays T&P NMs and Electronic Navigation Chart Preliminary Notices to Mariners (EP NMs), as well as areas where there is no admiralty paper chart, at an equivalent ENC scale on the ECDIS.
T&P Ns and EP NMs are displayed as coloured polygons, whereas a grey hatched polygon labelled No Overlay is used where there is no paper chart at an equivalent ENC scale.
Note that there may be delays in updating AIOs from the time a T&P or EP NM has been published, updated or cancelled.
It is a lso important to note that AIO is a visual layer over an ENC and does not display details of the actual notice.
In such circumstances, AIO user s should gather information from other sources, such as local NMs to determine whether there are any relevant T&P notices.
Recommendations • The company SMS should define policies and procedures for the OOW to display T&P NMs and use of the AIO function. • Specific details of a T&P/EP NM should be plotted as a manual layer as opposed to a generic text box and made alarmable to highlight any navigational hazards.
For example, the company SMS may require Navigating Officers to manually plot and display all T&P NMs within the XTC or within a specific number of miles either side of the planned track. • Navigating officers should not entirely rely on AIO as they may not be updated, and applicable T&P notices should be verified against weekly notices to mariners.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Charts and publications management.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19. 2.1 All sh ips, irrespective of size, shall have: .4 nautical charts and nautical publications to plan and display the ship’s route for the intended voyage and to plot and monitor positions throughout the voyage.
An electronic chart display and information system (E CDIS) is also acceptable as meeting the chart carriage requirements of this subparagraph.
Ships to which paragraph 2.10 applies shall comply with the carriage requirements for ECDIS therein.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures to manage the procurement and updating of Electronic Navigation Charts (ENCs) and Raster Navigation Charts (RNCs) to ensure compliance with the SOLAS carriage of nautical publications requirements.
The procedure should define: • Which electronic charts must be available on board the vessel at all times. • The process to determine which electronic charts must be available on board for a voyage. • How to obtain or update chart permits to ensure the electronic charts required to be carried by the company or for use during a voyage are available onboard and remain valid throughout a proposed voyage. • How to track which charts have current permits. • How to obtain electronic chart corrections and apply them to available charts. • How to track or view the electronic chart update history to verify that each ENC is fully corrected. • How to manage passage planning and monitoring where full ENC coverage is not available. • How to manage Temporary and Preliminary (T&P) notices applicable to ENCs or RNCs. onboard must define all necessary steps and record-keeping requirements to ensure that the management of electronic charts is complete.
Suggested Inspect o r Actions • Confirm the primary means of navigation as declared in the pre-inspection questionnaire was correctly stated. • Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for managing, ordering and updating ENCs and RNCs. • Review the onboard electronic chart management system for ENC and RNC and verify that the charts required for the previous voyage were available and permitted for use on each ECDIS. • Verify that where RNCs had been used; o The ECDIS had been used in RCDS mode. o That ENCs were no t available for the area. o That fully corrected paper charts were also available and in use. • Review the chart update records and verify that each ENC and RNC in use for navigation had been maintained up to date to the most recently published Notices to Mariners, including T&P corrections. • Review an individual ENC or RNC from the previous voyage which was identified as being affected by a T&P correction and verify that the correction was shown in the appropriate location. • Request the accompanying officer to demonstrate how T&P notices were applied: o Manually. o By use of an overlay. o Incorporated as part of the update of the ENC database. (CAES and CEES S93 charts) Expected Evidence • The company procedure that defined how ENCs and RNCs were to be managed • The onboard records identifying which ENCs and RNCs were active with current permits or were available on a Pay As You Sail (PAYS) basis. • ENC Status Report, where available. • The previous voyage passage plan records showing which ENCs and RNCs had been used. • Where ENC coverage was incomplete for a recent voyage, passage planning records demonstrating how the gap in coverage was addressed. • Records demonstrating that ENCs and RNCs had been corrected to the latest notice to mariners, including the application of T&P noti ces.
Potential Grounds for a
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 4.12 Charts and Nautical Publications 4.12.1 Carriage Of Charts And Nautical Publications It is required that all ships carry adequate and up to date official nautical charts, sailing directions, lists of lights and radio signals, Notices to Mariners, tide tables and all other nautical publications necessary to appraise, plan, execute and monitor a passage.
Use of a chart and publication management system will help ensure that charts and publications are effectively maintained.
A management system should record the charts, publications and licences/permits carried, and also when the charts and other publications were last corrected. 4.12.2 Official Charts and Nautical Publications Official nautical charts can be either in paper or electronic format.
Official nautical publications can also be in either paper or digital form.
In order for a nautical chart or publication to be considered official, it must be produced or approved by an authorised hydrographic office or relevant government institution in accordance with International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) resolutions and recommendations.
Only up to date official charts and publications should be used for appraisal, planning, execution and monitoring of a passage plan.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Charts and publications management.
IMO: ISM Code shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 19 2.1 All ships, irrespective of size, shall have: .4 nautical charts and nautical publications to plan and display the ship’s route for the intended voyage and to p lot and monitor positions throughout the voyage.
An electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) is also acceptable as meeting the chart carriage requirements of this subparagraph.
Ships to which paragraph 2.10 applies shall comply with the carr iage requirements for ECDIS therein. .5 back -up arrangements to meet the functional requirements of subparagraph .4 if this function is partly or fully fulfilled by electronic means.
Where a vessel carries paper charts to comply with the carriage of charts and nautical publications regulations, to mitigate gaps in ENC coverage, or for any other reason where paper charts will be used for navigational purposes, the vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that the paper charts are the latest edition and fully corrected before use.
The procedure should define the process for: • Correctly identifying the paper charts required for an intended voyage. • Ensuring paper charts required for an intended voyage are corrected prior to c ommencing passage planning. • Tracking the correction status of paper charts not in use. • Managing Temporary and Preliminary (T&P) notices. • Procuring new editions and additional paper charts. • The actions to be taken when directed to a port where appropriate paper charts are not onboard. • Obtaining weekly and cumulative Notices to Mariners. • Replacing damaged or worn paper charts.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for paper chart management.', 'Review the paper chart portfolio records and verify that all paper charts onboard were listed with their edition date.', 'Review a recent passage plan and verify that paper charts used for the voyage were fully corrected by spot sampling at least two charts.', 'Verify that applicable T&P corrections and NAVTEX and NAVAREA warnings had been applied to the paper charts used and that a system existed to remove them once they were cancelled.', 'Verify that all paper charts, including the largest scale charts applicable to the passage reviewed, were available onboard and had been used for navigation.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures for paper chart management.', 'The paper chart portfolio records.', 'Recent passage plan records showing which paper charts had been used.', 'The paper charts, where applicable, used on the previous passage', 'Communications and mitigation plan agreed with the company where a vessel had been directed to a port and the required paper charts were not onboard, if available.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 3.18 Periodic Checks of Navigational Equipment. 3.18.1 Operational checks on navigational equipment should be undertaken when preparing for sea and prior to port entry and at any other time required by the SMS.
Before entering restricted or coastal waters, it is important also to check that full control of engine and steering function is available.
Checklist B1 Steering Gear Test Routines.
Check list B6 Preparations For Sea.
Checklist B7 Preparations For Arrival.
Checklist B10 Navigation in Coastal Waters.
USCG: Code of Federal Regulations.
Title 33. § 164.25 Tests before entering or getting underway. (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section no person may cause a vessel to enter into or get underway on the navigable waters of the United States unless no more than 12 hours before entering or getting underway, the following equipment has been tested: (1) Primary and secondary steering gear.
The test procedure includes a visual inspection of the steering gear and its connecting linkage, and, where applicable, the operation of the following: (ii) Each steering position located on the navigating bridge. (iii) The main steering gear from the alternative power supply, if installed. (iv) Each rudder angle indicator in relation to the actual position of the rudder. (v) Each remote steering gear control system power failure alarm. (vi) Each remote steering gear power unit failure alarm. (vii) The full movement of the rudder to the required capabilities of the steering gear. (2) All internal vessel control communications and vessel control alarms. (3) Standby or emergency generator, for a s long as necessary to show proper functioning, including steady state temperature and pressure readings. (4) Storage batteries for emergency lighting and power systems in vessel control and propulsion machinery spaces. (5) Main propulsion machinery, ahead and astern.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 26 1.
Within 12 hours before departure, the ship’s steering gear shall be checked and tested by the ship’s crew.
The test procedure shall include, where applicable, the operation of the following: 1.
The main steering gear, 2.
The auxiliary steering gear, 3.
The remote steering gear control systems, 4.
The steering positions located on the navigation bridge, 5.
The emergency power supply, 6.
The rudder angle indicators in relation to the actual position of the rudder, 7.
The remote steering gear control system power failure alarms, 8.
The steering gear power unit failure alarms, and 9.
Automatic isolating arrangements and other automatic equipment. 2.The checks and tests shall include: 1.
The full movement of the rudder according to the required capabilities of the steering gear, 2.
A visual inspection of the steering gear and its connecting l inkages, and 3.
The operation of the means of communication between the navigating bridge and steering gear compartment. for ships which regularly engage on voyages of short duration.
Such ships shall carry out these checks and tests at least once every week.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures which require navigational and manoeuvring equipment to be function ally tested at defined points prior to, and during, a passage or operation.
The procedures should define the extent of the testing required to be carried out based on regulation, local rules, risk assessment and the vessel’s operation at the time of the required test.
The vessel operator should have developed checklists, adapted to reflect the equipment and systems fitted to the vessel, to ensure that comprehensive tests are carried out systematically.
Where a vessel operator had developed its procedures based on an administrative waiver of repetitive steering tests, documented evidence of such a waiver should be available onboard.
['Sight, and where necessary, review the company procedures which defined the requirement for testing navigational and manoeuvring equipment.', 'Verify that the vessel operator had provided vessel specific checklists to address the following: o Steering Gear Test Routines (modelled on BPG B1 and supporting notes). o Preparations for Sea (modelled on BPG B6 and supporting notes). o Preparations for Arrival (modelled on BPG B7 and supporting notes).', 'Review completed checklists for the testing of navigational equipment and manoeuvring machinery to verify that testing during a recent passage or, sequence of operations, had been performed in accordance with the company procedures.', 'Verify that where a vessel was operating under an administrative waiver to conduct steering gear tests on a weekly basis, rather that prior to each departure, that the waiver was available onboard.', 'Verify that any defects, detected in either navigational equipment or manoeuvring machinery during the required testing processes, had been followed up through the onboard defect reporting system.', 'Review an individual checklist with the accompanying navigation officer to verify that they were familiar with individual checks or tests that were required to be carried out.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures which defined the requirements for testing navigational equipment and manoeuvring machinery.', 'Completed checklists for the testing of navigational equipment and manoeuvring machinery for recent voyages.', 'Bridge Log Book.', 'Engine Log Book.', 'Any waivers issued by the Flag Administration relating to the periodicity of steering gear tests for vessels on short voyages.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 2.3.2 Official Nautical Publications and Additional Information.
A full appraisal of the passage plan should include a review and consideration of information additional to that on navigational charts, including but not limited to: • Sailing Directions. • Notices to Mariners. • Lists of Radio Signals. • Load Line Charts. • Ocean Passage/Routeing Charts and Guides. • Port Guides. • Lists of Lights. • Tide Tables and Tidal Stream Atlases. • Maritime Security Charts.
UK Admiralty: Guidance on the Use of ADMIRALTY Digital Publications (ADP) and ADMIRALTY e -Nautical Publications (e -NPs) 3 Flag and Port State Acceptance 3.1.
Where the UKHO’s digital nautical publications are used to meet the SOLAS carriage requirement, the R ecord of Equipment attached to the ship’s Safety Equipment Certificate should be appropriately endorsed to show that digital publications are being used and that appropriate backup is fitted.
This endorsement can be provided by a Flag State Administration’ s (FSA’s) Recognised Organisations (ROs), where authorised, who will also ensure that any specific FSA requirements have been implemented.
It is recommended that ships carry copies of any documentation issued by their FSAs along with a copy of these guidance notes.
It is also recommended that a notice of intention to use digital nautical publications is provided to the FSA may include: • Charts and publications management.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 27 Nautical charts and nautical publications.
Nautical charts and nautical publications, such as sailing directions, lists of lights, notice to mariners, tide tables and all other nautical publications necessary for the intended voyage, shall be adequate and up to date.
IMO: MSC -MEPC.2/Circ.2 IMO requirements on carriage of publications on board ships. 4 The publications may be carried in the form of electronic media such as CD -ROM in lieu of hard copies.
Acceptable publications in electronic form should be those issued by IMO or an Administration or a body authorized by an Administration to ensure correctness of their contents and to safeguard against illegal copying.
A medium could either contain a publication or as many publications as possible.
In any case, the media should be treated in accordance with the document control procedures in the ship’s SMS including procedures for timely update. 5 Notwithstand ing paragraph 4 above, the publications for emergency use, such as the International Code of Signals and the IAMSAR Manual should always be available in the form of hard copies, bearing in mind that such publications need to be readily available for use in case of emergency without being restricted to a specific place and by the availability of a computer.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures that identified which mandatory and discretionary nautical publications were required to be carried on board and the process for updating them to the latest information or edition available.
Where regulations allow for the carriage of mandatory publications in electronic format the procedure should indicate how backup provisions were to be provided onboard. .
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for managing, ordering and updating nautical publications.', 'Verify that the company procedure had defined which nautical publications were required to be carried, whether in hard or electronic form, and identified both mandatory and discretionary titles.', 'Review the onboard nautical publication management system and verify that latest editions of nautical publication s were available on board and that they had been maintained up to date.', 'Verify that nautical publications carried in the electronic format required to comply with SOLAS Regulation 27 were acceptable to the flag and that the required back up provision were in place. (as indicated on the Safety Equipment Certificate Form E).
Signals and the IAMSAR Manual, were onboard.
Expected Evidence', 'The nautical public ations.', 'The company procedure for managing, ordering and updating nautical publications.', 'The inventory of nautical publications indicating their edition date and latest correction applied, where applicable.', 'Where electronic publications were carried to com ply with SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 27, evidence that the publications were approved by flag and the means of back up were in accordance with the Safety Equipment Certificate Form E) Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Section 1 Effective Bridge Organization 1.2.1 Composition of the Bridge Team The Bridge Team should be sufficiently resourced to meet the operational requirements of the passage plan.
When considering the composition of the Bridge Team and ensuring that the bridge is never left unat tended at sea, the Master should take into account the following: • Visibility, sea state and weather conditions; • Traffic density; • Activities occurring in the area in which the ship is navigating; • Navigation in or near traffic separation schemes or other rou teing measures; • Navigation in or near fixed or mobile installations; • Ship operating requirements, activities and anticipated manoeuvres; • Operational status of bridge equipment including alarm systems; • Whether manual or automatic steering is anticipated; • Any demands on the navigational watch that may arise as a result of exceptional circumstances; and • Any other relevant standard, procedure or guidelines relating to watchkeeping arrangements or the activities of the vessel.
TMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place.
These procedures may include: • Bridge manning levels.
IMO: ISM Code shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures which consider the areas within which a ship will operate and define: • The minimum required bridge team composition considering the proximity of the vessel to navigational hazards, traffic density, weather conditions, and state of visibility. • The minimum required bridge team composition for activities such as sitting at anchor, drifting, “at sea” STS operations, Dynamically Positioned (DP) cargo operations or underway stores / personnel transfer operations. • The role of each bridge team member for each defined bri dge team composition. • The circumstances in which the helm will be manned. • The circumstances in which the officer of the watch may be the sole lookout. • The substitution of the Master during prolonged periods of enhanced bridge team composition. • The operational status of the machinery space considering the proximity of the vessel to navigational hazards, traffic density, weather conditions and state of visibility. • The passage planning requirement to identify the anticipated change in bridge team composition a nd machinery space status and, when manned, the requirement to be on standby for manoeuvring. • The requirement to record when the bridge team composition changes from one defined level to another. • The requirement to record when the machinery space status changes from unattended to attended and when the machinery space is on standby for manoeuvring.
When determining the bridge team composition, careful consideration should be given to non-navigational activities to ensure that the bridge team is never degraded by duties such as escorting the pilot to the embarkation station or the completion of administrative tasks.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures which define the bridge and machinery space team compositions.', 'Review a recent passage plan and verify that the anticipated changes in bridge team composition and machinery space operating status had been identified and documented in alignment with the company procedure.', 'Review the records for the same v oyage and verify; o That the bridge team composition and machinery space operating mode had been maintained in accordance with the passage plan. o That the helm had been operated in manual mode in accordance with company procedures. o That the bridge team composition had been adapted to address changes in visibility or other environmental conditions. o The actual bridge team composition at any stage of the voyage was appropriate to the proximity of the vessel to navigational hazards, traffic density weather conditions, and state of visibility.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedure(s) that defined bridge team composition and machinery space operating mode during all stages of a voyage .', 'Passage plan documentation for recent voyages, (not necessarily the last voyage).', 'Bridge Log Book, bell books, bridge checklists and any other supporting bridge records, either paper or electronic, Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Engine Room Procedures Guide.
First Edition. 7.1 Manning Level Changes The Chief Engineer or designated representative should increase manning levels when required, whether planned or unplanned.
As far as possible, the work/rest hour requirements should still be met. 7.1.1 Planned Changes The Chief Engineer should identify planned changes in consultation with the Master.
The planned changes should be identified for every passage of the ship.
Examples of events/operations requiring planned manning changes are : • Arrival/departure; • Cargo operations; • Bunkering; • Fuel changeovers; • Planned machinery overhauls; and • Docking for surveys and trial runs.
ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition.
Chapter 1.2.6 The Bridge Team and Internal Communication.
The Bridge Team has the central role in maintaining communications with the engine room and all other operating areas.
It is essential that bridge and engine room personnel communicate regularly on matters including: • Machinery and propulsion status, including defects; with the potential to affect machinery performance or the manoeuvrability of the ship; • Any planned or anticipated speed changes; and • Any environmental regulatory requirements.
The Bridge Team will co -ordinate the activities of the whole ship on behalf of the Master.
This will be aided by good internal communications and a well briefed plan.
This is particularly important during emergency situations when an effective response will depend on good communication and co-ordinated actions by all personnel.
Checklist B2: Example of a Bridge Manning Matrix.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: SOLAS Additional requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces Chapter II -1 Regulation 46 General 1 The arran gements provided shall be such as to ensure that the safety of the ship in all sailing conditions, including manoeuvring, is equivalent to that of a ship having the machinery spaces manned. 2 Measures shall be taken to the satisfaction of the Administration to ensure that the equipment is functioning in a reliable manner and that satisfactory arrangements are made for regular inspections and routine tests to ensure continuous reliable operation.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures which defined: • The circumstances in which the machinery space may be operated in the unattended mode. • Where the machinery space is required to be attended, the required machinery space team composition considering proximity to navigational hazar ds, traffic density and the state of visibility. • The minimum engine room manning requirements for activities such as drifting, “at sea” STS operations, Dynamically Positioned (DP) cargo operations or underway stores / personnel transfer operations. • When the machinery space is required to be attended for navigational safety, the role of each machinery space team member. • The substitution of the Chief Engineer during prolonged periods of enhanced machinery space team composition. • The record keeping requirements for the change of machinery space status and/or machinery space team composition. • The communication of the required machinery space status and/or manning level to the engineer officers at the passage planning stage and daily.
['operating mode for the various stages of a voyage.', 'Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure which defined the machinery space team composition considering the proximity to navigational hazards, the traffic density and the state of visibility and other operations such as drifting, “at sea” STS operations, Dynamically Positioned (DP) cargo operations or underway stores / personnel transfer operations.', 'Review the Engine Room Log Book for a recent voyage, including periods at anchor, to verify that the machinery space was attended, when required, with the appropriate team composition in accordance with the company procedure.', 'Review the Engine Room Daily Order Book to verify that the anticipated times of changing the status of the machinery space from unattended to attended had been communicated to the engine room staff.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedure that defined the required machinery space status during all stages of a voyage, including while at anchor, considering traffic density, proximity to navigational hazards and the state of visibility.', 'The company procedure that defined the required machinery space team composition consider ing traffic density, proximity to navigational hazards and the state of visibility and, during other operations such drifting, “at sea” STS operations, Dynamically Positioned (DP) cargo operations or underway stores / personnel transfer operations.', 'Engine Room Log Book, Engine Room Daily Order Book and any other supporting machinery space records.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide.
Fifth Edition. 5 Pilotage 5.1 Overview Efficient pilotage will depend on: • Effective communication between the Master, Bridge Team and Pilot. • Accurate exchange of information between the Master, Bridge Team and the Pilot, particularly on matters relating to safety, helm and telegraph orders. • Mutual understanding of duties and responsibilities; and • A complete awareness and understanding of the ship's systems, equipment and any deficiencies which may affect handling characteristics and manoeuvrability.
Checklist A1 Master/Pilot Information Exchange Checklist A2 Pilot Card IMPA: Guidance on the Master -Pilot Exchange (MPX) As with all properly constructed supporting text on pilotage, it is necessary to begin with the core foundation of IMO Resolution A960 (23) Section 5: 5 Master – pilot information exchange. 5.4 This exchange of information should include at least: • Presentation of a completed standard Pilot Card.
In addition, information should be provided on rate of turn at different speeds, turning circles, stopping distances and, if available, other appropriate data; • General agreement on plans and procedures, including contingency plans, for the anticipated passage. may be expected during the passage. • Discussion of any unusual ship-handling characteristics, machinery difficulties, navigational equi pment problems or crew limitations that could affect the operation, handling or safe manoeuvring of the ship; • Information on berthing arrangements; use, characteristics and number of tugs; mooring boats and other external facilities; • Information on mooring arrangements, and. • Confirmation of the language to be used on the bridge and with external parties. 5.5 It should be clearly understood that any passage plan is a basic indication of preferred intention and both the pilot, and the master should be prepared to depart from it when circumstances so dictate. 5.6 Pilots and competent pilotage authorities should be aware of the voyage planning responsibilities of masters under applicable IMO instruments.
TMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place.
These procedures may include: • Navigation with Pilot on board.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and the protection of the environment.
The various tasks should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
The vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure the pilot (or similar role*) is integrated into the bridge team and that specific information is documented and discussed prior to any transfer of conn or responsibility takes place.
The information should include but not be limited to: • The vessel particulars and manoeuvring characteristics. • The planned passage. • The review of the ECDIS and the status of safety depth alarms and layers in use. • The use of any navigational aids provided by the pilot. • Mooring and/or anchoring requirements. • Towage and/or tug assistance. • Under keel clearance. • Relevant defects and/or constraints.
The Master/Pilot exchange should be documented, discussed and agreed before any transfer of conn or responsibility takes place.
The Master/Pilot exchange should be repeated whenever there is a change of pilot.
The vessel should utilise checklists which have been adapted to the specific needs of the company and vessel type, and which were aligned with: ICS Bridge Procedures Guide – Annex 3 - Checklists • A1 Master/Pilot Information Exchange • A2 Pilot Card The vessel should record the time of completion of the Master/Pilot information exchange, and where different, the time of the transfer of the conn between the Master and Pilot.
The time of the transfer of the conn between Pilots and, as applicable, between the Pilot and Master on an outbound passage should also be recorded.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure for integrating a pilot* into the bridge team.', 'Review the Master/Pilot information exchange and pilot checklists from two recent operations and verify that the information required to be included had been fully and accurately entered and the pilot* had acknowl edged the handover of information, or where the pilot had refused to sign, the time of the completion of the handover had been recorded.', 'Review Bridge Log Books, bell books or other records and verify that the time of the transfer of the conn between the M aster and Pilot, between pilots and between the pilot and the Master had been recorded.', 'Interview the accompanying navigation officer to verify that they understood the source, intent and meaning of the information required to be entered on the Master/Pilot information and/or pilot card checklists.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedure for integrating a pilot* into the bridge team.', 'The Master/Pilot information exchange and pilot card checklists for recent operations.', 'The Bridge Log Book, bell book and other operational records covering recent operations.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition 1.2.7 Duties within the Bridge Team Maintaining Bridge Team performance will be aided by a bridge environment which is free from distractions.
To avoid disruption and distraction on the bridge it is recommended that: • Unrestricted bridge access is limited to only those with operational bridge responsibilities; • The use of mobile phones and other personal electronic devices should be strictly controlled (see Section 1.4); and • Internal and external communications should generally be restricted to those related to the safe navigation of the ship (see Section 1.5).
The Bridge should be free from distractions and all non -essential activity should be avoided. 1.3 Company policy and procedures The ISM Code requires every company to have an SMS which covers instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the environment.
This should include practical guidance on navigational safety including: • Bridge access and distraction prevention procedures. 1.4 Mobile phones and personal electronic devices The company should have a written policy requiring that mobile phones and other personal electronic devices should only be used on the bridge in circumstances approved by the Master.
Notwithstanding occasions when use of mobile phones or personal electronic devices may be permitted, the Company policy should minimise the distraction resulting from such devices by, in general, limiting their use to operationally necessary circumstances.
Where internet and email services are available on the bridge, the Company should have a policy to manage their use.
Access to internet and e mail use by bridge watchkeepers should generally be limited to those circumstances where it is necessary for the safe navigation of the ship, in order to minimise distraction that might be caused to the Bridge Team.
Internet access and email on the bridge should usually be restricted to: • Updates to nautical charts and publications, licences and permits; • Weather information; • Navigational warnings; and • Information relevant to the ship’s operations and passage plan.
TMSA KPI 5.1.3 requires that procedures to ensure effective bridge resource management are in place.
IMO: ISM Code 1.4 Functional requirements for a Safety Management System (SMS) Every Company should develop, implement and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS) which includes the following functional requirements: 1. a safety and environmental protection policy, 2. instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection of the environment in compliance with relevant international and flag State legislation,
The vessel operator should have developed procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge including guidance on: • Bridge access by personnel with no operational bridge responsibilities. • The use of mobile phones and other personal electronic devices. • Internal and external communications. • Non-essential activity. • Internet and email access on the bridge. • The effective management of the bridge space where it was combined with the cargo and/or machinery control and monitoring functions.
Sugg ested Inspector Actions • Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge. • During the inspection of the bridge note any evidence of non- compliance with the company procedures. • Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge.
Expected Evidence • Company procedures to prevent disruption and distraction on the bridge.
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Industry Guidance IMO: MSC.1/Circ.1039 Guidelines for shore -based maintenance of satellite EPIRBs 4 Maintenance service interval 4.1 406 MHz satellite EPIRBs should be inspected and tested in accordance with MSC/Circ.1040. 4. 2 S hore-based maintenance of all satellite EPIRBs, as defined in paragraph 1.2, should be carried out in accordance with these guidelines at intervals specified by the flag Administration and not exceeding 5 years.
It is recommended that the maintenance be performed at the time when the battery is to be changed.
IMO: MSC.1/Circ.1040/Rev.2 Guidelines on annual testing of 406 mhz satellite EPIRBs 1 These Guidelines are applicable to the annual testing of emergency position- indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) that are approved to comply with the provisions of SOLAS regulation IV/15.9. 2 The testing should be carried out by appropriately trained and approved personnel using suitable test equipment capable of performing all the relevant measurements required in these Guidelines (this testing normally will be done by a radio surveyor as part of the annual radio survey).
All tests of electrical parameters should be performed in the self-test mode, if possible. 3 If a distress signal is transmitted accidentally, the trans mission should immediately be stopped, and the local rescue coordination centre (RCC)1 should be contacted immediately and informed.
The nearest Cospas -Sarsat mission control centre (MCC) should also be informed (see also Guidelines for the avoidance of false distress alerts (resolution A.814(19), as may be updated)). 4 The examination of the installed EPIRB should include: .1 checking position and mounting of the bracket to ensure unimpeded float -free operation; cracks to the casing, or of water ingress; .3 carrying out the beacon self -test routine, including the GNSS self -test, if applicable; .4 checking that the EPIRB identification (15 Hex ID f or first -generation beacons and 23 Hex ID for second-generation beacons and other required information, including, if applicable, the AIS identity (User ID)) is clearly marked on the outside of the equipment; .5 decoding the EPIRB hexadecimal identification digits (15 Hex ID for first -generation beacons and 23 Hex ID for second-generation beacons) and other information from the transmitted signal, including, if applicable, the AIS identity (User ID), checking that the decoded information (Hex ID or MMSI/call sign data, as required by the Administration) is identical to the identification marked on the beacon; .6 verifying that the MMSI number or radio call sign, if encoded in the beacon, corresponds with that assigned to the ship; .7 verifying registration in an appropriate beacon registration database through documentation or through the point of contact associated with that country code; .8 checking the battery expiry date; .9 checking the hydrostatic release and its expiry date, as appropriate; .10 verifying the emission in the 406 MHz band using the self -test mode or an appropriate device to avoid transmission of a distress call to the satellites; .11 if possible, verifying emission on the 121.5 MHz frequency using the self -test mode or an appropriate devi ce to avoid activating the SAR system; .12 verifying emission on the appropriate AIS frequencies, if applicable, using the self -test mode or an appropriate device to avoid creating false alerts; .13 verifying that the EPIRB has been maintained by an approv ed shore -based maintenance provider at intervals required by the Administration, in accordance with the most recent revision of MSC/Circ.1039; .14 after the test, remounting the EPIRB in its bracket, checking that no transmission has been started; .15 verifying the presence of a firmly attached lanyard in good condition; the lanyard should be neatly stowed, and should not be tied to the vessel or the mounting bracket; .16 checking the presence of beacon operating instructions manual; and .17 checking the presence of pictorial instructions for manual operation visible at the location of the beacon.
TMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety Officer.
Safety inspections of the ship: • Include all accessible areas of the ship.
IMO: ISM Code 10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be esta blished by the Company.
Chapter IV Regulation 7 1 Every ship shall be provided with: .6 subject to the provisions of regulation 8.3, a satellite emergency position -indicating radio beacon (satellite EPIRB) which shall be: 1. capable of transmitting a distress alert through the polar orbiting satellite service operating in the 406 MHz band. 2. installed in an easily accessible position. 3. ready to be manually released and capable of being carried by one person into a survival craft. 4. capable of floating free if the ship sinks and of being automatically activated when afloat; and 5. capable of being activated manually.
Chapter IV Regulation 15 9.
Satellite EPIRBs shall be: .1 annually tested for all aspects of operational efficiency, with special em phasis on checking the emission on operational frequencies, coding and registration, at intervals as specified below: .1.2 on cargo ships, within 3 months before the expiry date, or 3 months before or after the anniversary date, of the Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate.
The test may be conducted on board the ship or at an approved testing station; and .2 subject to maintenance at intervals not exceeding five years, to be performed at an approved shore-based maintenance facility.
The vessel operator should have developed a procedure to ensure that EPIRBs were periodically inspected, tested and maintained, and ready for immediate use in an emergency.
Most EPIRB's have a self -test facility which is usually a spring -loaded switch.
When ac tivated a light will indicate that the test circuits are operating correctly and sometimes this will also activate the strobe light.
It is recommended that the self -test switch be held for no more than 2 flashes of the strobe light, or no longer than 1 minute after the first self - test mode burst transmission.
When the self -test is activated on a 406 MHz EPIRB, the EPIRB is allowed to radiate a single burst which is specially coded so that it is ignored by the COSPAS -SARSAT system.
The EPIRB must never be tested by actual operation.
However, self -tests will use some of the beacon’s limited battery power and should only be performed in accordance with the beacon manufacturer’s guidance.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedure to ensure that EPIRBs were periodically inspected, tested and maintained, and ready for immediate use in an emergency.', 'Review records of periodic inspections, tests and maintenance of the EPIRB.', 'Inspect the EPIRB and associated fittings. o How to conduct the self', "test for the EPIRB. o The manufacturer's instructions on the frequency of conducting the self", 'test function to preserve battery life. o The procedure to follow should the EPIRB be activated in non', 'emergency circumstances. o Manual operation of the EPIRB.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedure to ensure that EPIRBs were periodically inspected, tested and maintained and ready for immediate use in an emergency.', 'The GMDSS Radio Log Book.', 'Records of periodic inspections, tests and maintenance of the EPIRB.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance IMO: Resolution A.802(19) Recommendation on performance standards for survival craft radar transponders for use in search and rescue operations 2 General The SART should be capable of indicating the location of a unit in distress on the assisting units radars by means of a series of equally spaced dots (see resolution A.530(13)). 2.1 The SART should: .10 be equipped with buoyant lanyard, suitable for use as a tether, if it is capable of floating. * If an on -board test is performed using a shipborne 9 GHz radar, activation of the SART should be limited to a few seconds to avoid harmful interference with other shipborne radars and excessive consumption of battery energy. 4 Labelling In addition to the items specified in resolution A. 694(17) on general requirements, the following should be clearly indicated on the exterior of the equipment: 1. brief operating instructions; and 2. expiry date for the primary battery used.
IMO: Resolution MSC.246(83) Performance standards for survival craft AIS search and rescue transmitters (AIS-SART) for use in search and rescue operations 2 General a unit in distress.
The transmitted messages should be compatible with existing AIS installations.
The transmitted messages should be recognized and displayed by assisting units in the reception range of AIS -SART, and clearly distinguish the AIS -SART from an AIS installation. 2.1 The AIS -SART should: .9 be equipped with buoyant lanyard, suitable for use as a tether, if it is capable of floating. .17 be capable of being tested for all functionalities using specific test information. 4 Labelling In addition to the items specified in resolution A.694(17) **, the following should be clearly indicated on the exterior of the equipment: .1 brief operating and test instructions; and .2 expiry date for the primary battery used.
TMSA KPI 9A.1.1 requires that safety inspections are conducted at scheduled intervals by a designated Safety Officer.
Safety inspections of the ship: • Include all accessible areas of the ship.
IMO: ISM Code 10.1 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the s hip is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the Company.
IMO: SOLAS Chapter III Regulation 6 2.2 Search and rescue locating devices At least one search and rescue locating device shall be carried on each side of every passenger ship and of every cargo ship of 500 gross tonnage and upwards.
At least one search and rescue locating device shall be carried on every cargo ship of 300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 500 gross tonnage.
Such search and rescue locating devices shall conform to the applicable performance standards not inferior to those adopted by the Organization*.
The search and rescue locating devices** shall be stowed in such location that they can be rapidly placed in any survival craft other than the liferaft or liferafts required by regulation
Industry Guidance IMO: Resolution MSC.149(77) Adoption of the revised performance standards for survival craft portable two - way vhf radiotelephone apparatus 2.1 The equipment should be portable and capable of being used for on-scene communication between survival craft, between survival craft and ship and between survival craft and rescue unit.
It may also be used for on-board communications when capable of operating on appropriate frequencies. 2.3 The equipment should: .11 have provisions for its attachment to the clothing of the user and also be provided with a wrist or neck strap.
For safety reasons, the strap should include a suitable weak link to prevent the bearer from being ensnared. .13 be either of a highly visible yellow/orange colour or marked with a surrounding yellow/orange marking strip. 3.1 The two-way radiotelephone should be capable of operation on the frequency 156.800 MHz (VHF channel 16) and on at least one additional channel. 12.1 The source of energy should be integrated in the equipment and may be replaceable by the user.
In addition, provision may be mad e to operate the equipment using an external source of electrical energy. 12.2 Equipment for which the source of energy is intended to be user -replaceable should be provided with a dedicated primary battery for use in the event of a distress situation.
This battery should be equipped with a non- replaceable seal to indicate that it has not been used. 12.3 Equipment for which the source of energy is intended to be non-user -replaceable should be provided with a primary battery.
The portable two-w ay radiotelephone equipment should be fitted with a non-replaceable seal to indicate that it has not been used. 12.5 Primary batteries should have a shelf life of at least 2 years, and if identified to be user replaceable should be of a colour or marking as defined in
Industry Guidance ICS: Bridge Procedures Guide – Fifth Edition 3.15 GMDSS Watchkeeping To enable a ship to send and receive distress, urgency and safety information, the OOW should hold a General or restricted Operator’s Certificate (GOC/ROC) as appropriate and be familiar with the requirements and procedures for GMDSS watchkeeping….
The International telecommunications Union (ITU) publication Manual for Use by the Maritime Mobile and Maritime Mobile Satellite Services contains relevant extracts from the ITU Radio Regulations, setting out the correct procedures to be followed. 3.15.1 Radio watchkeeping The OOW is responsible for ensuring compliance with the ship’s radio watchkeeping requirements.
In general, a radio watch should be maintained on all frequencies necessary to receive distress, urgency and safety messages appropriate to the sea area in which the ship is operating. 3.15.2 Emergency Communications The OOW should be familiar with the procedures for sending distress, urgency and safety messages contained in the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual Volume III, (IAMSAR Vol III), Section 4.
Particular care should be taken to ensure that alerts and messages sent by DSC, radio-telephony and satellite communications are given an appropriate priority.
In addition, it is important for the OOW to ensure that: • During a distress, a qualified operator is designated as being responsible for radio communications….
Every precaution should be taken to avoid false distress alerts being sent.
IMO/ICAO: International aeronautical and maritime search and rescue manual (IAMSAR) Vol III Methods of alert - Distress alert from a vessel Use any of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) equipment to transmit a distress alert: • Inmarsat distress call • VHF channel 16 (156.8 MHz FM) • DSC on (VHF/MF or HF) • EPIRB Any distress transmissions on the frequency VHF channel 16, 2,182 kHz could be preceded by a digital selective call.
In remote oceans areas, the distress call should also be transmitted on a ship-to -shore HF circuit to a CRS, especially when distress calls on 2,182 kHz, or channel 16 are not replied to by other stations.
TMSA KPI 11.1.1 requires that detailed vessel emergency response plans include initial notification procedures and cover all credible emergency scenarios.
Vessel emergency response plans are reviewed at least annually, to reflect changes in legislation, contact details, vessel equipment and changes in company procedures.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriat e, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
The operator should have developed procedures for emergency communications which gave guidance on, and designated responsibility for distress communications in an emergency situation using the vessel’s GMDSS equipment.
Instructions for the preparation and transmission of distress and urgency messages using the GMDSS equipment should be clearly displayed by the equipment.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for emergency communications using the GMDSS equipment.', 'Review the entries in the GMDSS Radio Log Book and verify that distress, urgency and safety messages received had been recorded in accordance with company procedures.', 'Interview the accompanying officer to assess their familiarity with the procedures for sending and receiving distress , urgency and safety messages using the GMDSS equipment.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures for emergency communications.', 'The GMDSS Radio Log Book.', 'International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR) Vol III.
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In addition, procedures should ensure: • Details of restrictions on the use of mobile telephones are prominently displayed at the gangway. • Non-intrinsically safe mobile phones, including any provided by the terminal for ship/shore communications, are not used outside of the accommodation block. • If the use of intrinsically safe mobile phones is allowed outside of the accommodation block, they are clearly identified, and proper certification is provided.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the safe use of radio and telephone equipment during cargo and ballast handling operations.', 'During the course of the inspection, confirm: o Sufficient VHF or UHF portable radios in good working order were available to properly coordinate cargo, ballast and bunker handling operations. o Non', 'intrinsically safe mobile phones were not in use outside the accommodation block. o Main transmitting antennae were earthed or isolated during cargo and ballast handling operations and that no transmissions were being made for test or other purposes. o Fixed VHF and UHF equipment was switched to low power (one watt or less) during cargo and ballast handling operations, and that portable VHF or UHF radios in use had a power output of one watt or less. o Details of restrictions on the use of mobile telephones were prominently displayed at the gangway.', 'If MF/HF radio or radar equipment was under repair/service, confirm this had been discussed at the pre', 'transfer conference and a safe system of work agreed.', 'If the use of intrinsically safe mobile phones was allowed outside the accommodation block, verify any equipment observed in use was clearly marked as intrinsically safe and/or properly certificated.
Expected Evidence', 'The procedure for the safe use of radio and telephone equipment during cargo and ballast handling operations.', 'Certification for any intrinsically safe mobile phones in use outside of the accommodation block.', 'The inventory of intrinsically safe portable VHF/UHF radios used for cargo, ballast and bunker operations.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance IMCA: M 190 Guidance for Developing and Conducting Annual DP Trials Programmes for DP Vessels.
Rev 2.1 4 Development of the DP Annual Trials Programme Annual testing of the DP system, to demonstrate that the vessel remains fit for purpose for DP operations, may be conducted during an annual DP trial, incremental tests, or a combination of both.
The DP annual trials programme might also provide for rolling tests that are not necessarily repeated on an annual basis.
The approach to testing is to be clearly identified within the DP annual trials programme.
Refer to the example matrix template of tests contained within Appendix 1. 4.1 Difference Between an Annual DP Trial and an FMEA Proving Trial The purpose of an FMEA proving trial is, as its name suggests, to prove the findings of the failure modes and effects analysis.
Although an annual DP trial is closely related, the two trials have a different focus, and this will influence the types of tests included and the way they are carried out.
Tests performed on an annual basis focus on proving that the DP system is fully functional and well maintained and the redundancy concept remains intact.
In addition to being a functional test of the DP system the tests, whilst not being of a destructive nature, should also seek to establish continued compliance of the system with respect to the worst case failure design intent (WCFDI) for its defined operating modes.
FMEA proving trials generally focus on proving that the worst -case failure design intent is not exceeded and that failure effects are as expected.
There may also be a greater degree of uncertainty regarding failure effects and the provision of alarms to indicate that the redundancy concept has been compromised.
FMEA proving trials may include exploratory trials designed to provide clarity of assumptions made during the analysis or additional information about how the redundancy concept functions.
Once the assumption or particular function of the redundancy concept has been verified, there may be no need to repeat those particular tests again.
It should be noted that some tests during FMEA proving trials might be considered to be high risk to personnel and/or equipment. 4.2 Responsibility for Developing the DP Annual Trials Programme and implemented.
The vessel operator is further responsible to ensure the competence and experience of vessel crew, persons, organisations and third parties developing, conducting and witnessing the trials. 5 Conduct of Annual DP Tests 5.1 Scheduling of Annual DP Tests Guidel ines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning systems (IMO MSC.1Circ.1580) states that annual DP tests should be carried out within three months before or after each anniversary date of the initial complete test of all systems and components.
If, for example, major upgrades or conversions are carried out on a vessel or that a vessel has been reactivated following layup, all requiring a complete new FMEA proving trial, then the anniversary date may be adjusted to that date. 5.2 Independent Witnesses Independent verification of testing intended to prove the integrity of systems where the consequences of failure can be severe is desirable.
The independent witnesses should be sufficiently removed from day to day operational control or responsibility for t he DP system and vessel.
They should also be familiar with the vessel or type of vessel and with the DP annual trials programme.
The degree of independence is a matter for the vessel operator and should be such that it provides confidence to all intended users of the Annual DP Trials Report that the results can be accepted without further verification or testing.
Failure to provide users of the report with the necessary level of confidence may limit the acceptance of the document and lead to costly repetiti on of tests.
The independent witness should not carry out any of the tests themselves.
IMCA recommends that the independent witness is accredited according to the IMCA DP Practitioner Accreditation Scheme. 5.10 Generating Findings from Test Results 5.10.1 Categorisation Three categories of finding have been widely adopted and are often prefixed with a letter A, B or C.
However, there is sometimes inconsistency in the categorisation of findings, and it is the intention of this document to give guidanc e in the categorisation of failure effects and the implications of ‘findings’ in each category. 5.10.1.1 A – For Immediate Attention A valid ‘A’ finding indicates that the vessel’s DP system does not comply with requirements for the appropriate DP equipment class.
Only regulatory bodies such as flag states have the authority to prevent a vessel from conducting any type of operation but an ‘A’ finding has serious implications as any client would likely be unwilling to allow the vessel to carry out DP operations until any ‘A’ findings are addressed.
Naturally, this can have considerable financial consequences. 5.10.1.2 B – For Action When Reasonably Convenient A valid ‘B’ finding indicates a fault or failure that requires attention, but also recognises that the vessel’s DP system does still comply with requirements for the appropriate DP equipment class. 5.10.1.3 C – For Future Attention/Consideration to a clear breach of the relevant DP rules and guidelines.
Category C findings may make reference to features, functions or practices which are generally expected by the industry while recognising that they are not an absolute requirement on the subject vessel.
They may also refer to recent changes in industry guidelines or class rules which again may not apply to the subject vessel, but which may offer tangible benefits if applied to the vessel.
Category C findings should only be made where they represent genuine added value and close out actions are reasonably achievable. 5.10.2 Open Findings from the FMEA or Previous Annual DP Trials As part of the assurance aspect of the DP annual trials programme, the findings of the FMEA and the previous annual DP trial should be reviewed.
If the vessel operator has an effective audit or non- conformity tracking system, then any findings arising from these sources should be documented with close out actions (even where the decision has been to take no action, along with the justification).
Any open items should be noted prior to commencing the current trials, particular care should be taken when performing incremental testing as part of the annual trials programme and the trials programme should ensure that the open item is either closed out or confirmed as a still open ‘finding’.
Such items which cannot be closed out should be included in the findings section of the updated annual DP trials report. 6 Format of the Annual DP Trials Report 6.1 Description of Essential Information to be Included in the Final Report When preparing the annual DP report, it is important to clearly identify the method used to conduct each test: • Annual DP trial; • Incremental test; • Rolling test; • Review of planned maintenance.
An example of an annual DP trials report is included at Appendix 1 to this document, but the general sections are briefly described below: • Executive summary… • Introduction… • Vessel particulars… • Conclusions – Statement that the trials showed compliance with the witnesses’ interpretation of the relevant rules and guidelines, i.e., IMO, IMCA and class… • Findings – Description of categories A, B and C.
List of findings from the trials.
Open findings carried forward from previous trials.
Items that should be considered for updating the FMEA.
IMCA M 117 Rev. 2 Guidelines for The Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel Appendix 6 DP system emergency drills Introduction Emergency drill scenarios should be developed from the experience gained during the conduct of annual DP trials and FMEA reviews undertaken onboard the vessel.
The annual trials and revised FMEA documents provide the background for specific vessel drills, and these should always be readily available for information and reference by IMCA DP reporting scheme.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Actions upon equipment failure.
IMO: ISM Code 10.
Maintenance of the Ship and Equipment 10.3 The Company should identify equipment and technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations.
The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of such equipment or systems.
These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by arrangements and equipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.
IMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems 4 Operational requirements 4.6 The following checklists, test procedures, trials and instructions should be incorporated into the vessel -specific DP operations manuals: Annual tests and procedures. 5.1 Surveys and testing 5.1.1.3 An annual survey should be carried out within three months before or after each anniversary date of the Dynamic Positioning Verification Acceptance Document.
The annual survey should ensure that the DP system has been mai ntained in accordance with applicable parts of the Guidelines and is in good working order.
The annual test of all important systems and components should be carried out to document the ability of the DP vessel to keep position after single failures associated with the assigned equipment class and validate the FMEA and operations manual.
The type of tests carried out and results should be recorded and kept on board. 5.1.3 These surveys and tests should be witnessed by officers of the Administration.
The Administration may, however, entrust the surveys and testing either to surveyors nominated for the purpose or to organizations recognized by it.
In every case, the Administration concerned should guarantee the completeness and efficiency of the surveys and testing.
The Administration may entrust the company of the vessel to carry out annual and minor repair surveys according to a test programme accepted by the Administration.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures giving guidance on the performance of Annual DP Trials within +/ - 3 months of the anniversary date of the original FMEA Proving Trials or following any modifications to the onboard DP Systems.
A copy of the Annual DP Trials report should be available on board.
DP operators should be familiar with the procedures for conducting Annual DP Trials and the content of the report(s).
Onboard training and drills involving various DP scenarios, (ideally based on the experience gained from the Annual DP Trials), should be conducted, and records maintained.
['o List of findings, and closeout actions. o Summary statement confirming the fitness of the vessel to carry out DP operations equivalent to its DP class. o Test sheets from the PMS if a rolling test program is utilised.', 'Sight and review previous Annual DP Trial reports.', 'Sight and review records of training and/or drills involving DP scenarios.', 'Interview the accompanying officer t o verify their familiarity with the annual DP trial procedures and the contents of the report.
Expected Evidence', 'The latest Annual DP Trials report.', 'If the Annual DP trials were being carried out as part of a rolling test programme over the year, test sheets and/or other documented evidence of compliance from the Planned Maintenance System.', 'Previous Annual DP Trials reports.', 'Records of training and/or drills involving DP scenarios.
Potential Grounds for a']
The vessel operator should have developed procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the fixed fire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment that included: • A description of the fixed fire extinguishing system, its components, and its functions. • Instructions for the operation of the fixed fire extinguishing system. • A maintenance plan.
The above may form part of the cargo system operation manual and the ship’s maintenance plan.
If the control station or release cabinet door is locked, a key to the door shall be in a break -glass type enclosure conspicuously located adjacent to the door.
Instructions for safe entry into the bottle space should be posted at each ent rance and should include, but not be limited to: • Starting the ventilation fan. • Waiting for a set period before entering. • The use of a personal gas monitor. • Notifying the OOW of entry into, and exit from, the space The entrances to the enclosed space containing cargo handling equipment e.g., compressor room or motor room, should be marked with a notice indicating the space is protected by a fixed fire extinguishing system.
Where a CO2 system is installed, a notice should be exhibited at the controls st ating that due to the electrostatic ignition hazard, the system is to be used only for fire extinguishing and not for inerting purposes.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the fixed fire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment.', 'Review the bottle space safe entry instructions.', 'Inspect the space(s) containing the machinery space fixed firefighting system bottles. operating instructions.', 'Review the inspection and servicing data available in the space.', 'If necessary, review the records of inspections, tests and maintenance carried out recorded in the maintenance plan.', 'Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the purpose and operation of the system and the maintenance plan.
Note .
On CO2 systems there are ‘pins’ in the activation assembly, and traditionally, these pins had to be removed for the system to be ready for immediate use.
On some modern systems, these ‘pins’ have to be left ‘in’ for the system to be ready for immediate use.
When inspecting CO2 systems, the inspector should determine from the accompanying officer whether the pins should be ‘in’ or ‘out’ for the system to be ready for immediate use.
If in any doubt reference should be made to the manufacturer’s operating instructions.
Expected Evidence', 'The company procedures for the operation, inspection and maintenance of the fixed fire extinguishing system installed within enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment.', 'Records of inspections, tests and maintenance of the fixed fire extinguishing system installed wi thin enclosed spaces containing cargo handling equipment.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance OCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations 6.6.8 Position Reference System It is recommended that in accordance with other critical DP operations, when a DP bow loading tanker is operating in auto DP mode, independent PRS operating on different principles are used.
The following should be taken into account: • The DP system should be equipped with a set of PRS, and sensors optimised for the location and contractual scope of work. • It is recommended to have a minimum of three different PRS in use at any time while on DP offtake operation. • Sensors and antennae should be located to reduce risk of interference and shadow zones. • The DP system should be equipped with a minimum of two independent differential satellite positioning systems.
The differential correction signals should be from different sources and have totally different signal paths. • The use and interface of differential satellite positioning systems should be in accordance with latest IMCA guidance.
The field operations manuals and the DP bow loading tanker’s operating guidelines should provide guidance on PRS at particular locations.
IMCA: Guidelines on the Shared Use of Sensors for Survey and Positioning Purposes 6.3 Documentation Vessel equipment configuration and calibration records should include as a minimum: • sensor offsets including clear description of CRP (common reference point) or CoG (centre of gravity), and sign convention; TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Electronic aids to navigation including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS .
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems 3.4.3 Position reference systems 1.
Position reference systems should be selected with due consideration to operational requirements, both with regard to restrictions caused by the manner of deployment and expected performance in working situations. 2.
For equipment class 1, at least two independent position reference systems should be installed and simultaneously available to the DP control system during operation. 3.
For equipment classes 2 and 3, at least three independent position reference systems should be installed and simultaneously available to the DP control system during operation. 4.
When two or more position reference systems are required, they should not all be of the same type, but based on different principles and suitable for the operating conditions. 5.
The position reference systems should produce data with adequate accuracy and repeatabili ty for the intended DP operation. 6.
The performance of position reference systems should be monitored, and warnings should be provided when the signals from the position reference systems are either incorrect or substantially degraded. 7.
For equipment class 3, at least one of the position reference systems should be connected directly to the backup control system and separated by an A -60 class division from the other position reference systems.
['Sight, and where necessary review, company procedures for the use of Position Reference Systems during DP operations at each offtake location.', 'Sight and where necessary review, the sensor offset data file.', 'Review the DP logbook and data log for any indication of PRS faults.', 'Inspect the PRS equipment recognising that it might not be possible t o run or demonstrate while alongside a terminal.', 'Company procedures for the use of Position Reference Systems during DP operations at each offtake location.', 'Sensor offset data file.', 'DP logbook.', 'DP data log.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance OCIMF: Dynamic Positioning Failure Mode Effect Analysis Assurance Framework Risk-based Guidance 1st Ed 2020 2.1 Introduction Codes, standards and practices applied to DP vessels are based on redundancy to ensure that no single failure leads to a loss of position and/or heading, for vessels assigned DP Equipment Classes 2 and 3.
Loss of Position (LOP) incidents occur when the DP redundancy concept is defeated.
Investigations have revealed that common points between redundant equipment groups are significant causal and contributory factors.
OCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations 10.9 Primary field risk management methodology: field operator and offtake tanker technical operator interface A field operator’s SMS should ensure that: • Field managers, offtake tanker technical managers and key offshore terminal and tanker personnel are given the opportunity to learn from previous experiences.
A process should be in place to ensure open communication and information sharing about incidents and near misses.
Norwegian Oil and Gas recommended guidelines for offshore l oading shuttle tankers Guideline No. 140 10.6 Incident reports, investigations, and industrial experience transfer The OLST (Offshore Loading Shuttle Tanker) owner or operator should have a DP incident reporting system for reporting in accordance with IMCA M 103, latest edition.
A PMS data logger should be provided as a part of the DP system.
Recorded data should be electronically stored and made available for Charterer(s) or field operator(s) on request. operator(s).
The OLST owner or operator should identify a qualified individual within its management structure with responsibility for DP incident and occurrence investigation and closeout.
The OLST owner or operator should be member of IMCA and actively participate in IMCA’s performance and improvement schemes.
The OLST owners or operators should have in place a system for experience transfer of operational knowledge.
E.8 Independent position monitoring and logging system The OLST should have an independent Position Monitoring System data logger unit (Parker or equivalent) fitted for real-time data acquisition, calculation, logging and displaying designed to monitor DP controlled offshore loading.
When in loading phase, the system should give an alarm (both audible and visual) if calculated speed ahead is higher than a pre- set limit.
All data from the independent position monitoring system should be made available to field operator(s) in the event of incident investigations.
Crude oil flow -monitoring should also be displayed and logged via this system.
The data should be stored for a period of minimum 1 year.
IMCA: The Design and Operation of DP Vessels IMCA M 103 Rev. 4 January 2019 3.3.2 Recommended Documentation The documents in Table 2 should be kept on board and in addition, where feasible, at the shore-based centres of technical and operational management.
Where a periodicity for document storage is recommended, this is not to be taken as superseding any applicable regulatory requirements for the minimum storage period for such documents. 10.
DP incident reports – Records of all DP station keeping and other DP related incidents, including investigation records and close outs should be retained on board permanently. 14.
DP fault log – Records of all faults related to the DP system should be retained on board permanently. 15.
Data logging – Records should be retained on board for the period set by the owner/operator and, where relating to a DP incident, permanently stored.
Appendix 19 DP Station Keeping Event Reporting 2016 Review The review concluded that the scheme should have a maximum of three well defined categories and, so as to encourage the reporting of all events, not just incidents, the scheme would be renamed ‘The IMCA DP station keeping event reporting scheme’.
The three categories are listed below: • DP incident – A major system failure or human factor which has resulted in total loss of DP capability; • DP undesired event – A system failure or human factor which has caused a loss of redundancy and/or compromised DP capability; • DP observation – An event that has not resulted in a loss of redundancy or compromised DP operational capability but is still deemed worthy of reporting.
TMSA KPI 8.1.1 requires that procedures ensure prompt reporting and investigation of incidents and significant near misses.
Procedures may include: • Person/department responsible for investigation. • Description of the investigation process.
IMO: ISM Code 9.1 The SMS should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations are reported to the Company, investigated and analysed with the objective of improving safety and pollution prevention.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures for recording, reporting and investigating DP related incidents, undesired events and observations: • DP incidents – A major system failure or human factor which has resulted in total loss of DP capability. • DP undesired events – A system failure or human factor which has caused a loss of redundancy and/or compromised DP capability. • DP observations – An event that has not resulted in a loss of redundancy or compromised DP operational capability but is still deemed worthy of reporting.
If an independent data logger unit that records all DP parameters is not fitted, procedures should ensure relevant data is secured in the event of a DP incident.
Reports can be made either according to the vessel’s ISM system or via the method set out in IMCA M 103, latest revision.
The procedures should include a system to actively transfer industry experience and operational knowledge gained from DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures for recording, reporting and investigating DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.', 'Sight and review: o Records of DP related incidents, undesired events and observations. o Independent data logger records, if readily accessible. o DP fault log.', 'Inspect the independent data logger.', 'Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the company procedures for recording, reporting and investigating DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.
Expected Evidence', 'Company procedures for recording, reporting and investigating DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.', 'Records of DP related incidents, undesired events and observations.', 'Independent data logger records.', 'DP fault log.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance IMCA: The Design and Operation of DP Vessels IMCA M 103 Rev. 4 January 2019 3.3.2 Recommended Documentation 4.
DP Capability Plots - These should be hard copy plots of the vessel’s calculated capability to maintain position in various operational scenarios.
They should be readily available at the DP control location. 9.
DP Operations Manual - Vessel -specific DP operations manual, to be readily accessible at the DP control location.
It is recommended that owner/operators develop a standardised DP operations manual table of contents for vessels in their fleet based on the requirements of section 4.6 of IMO MSC.1/Circ 1580.
Modifications and amendments to the DP operations manual should be subject to MoC processes. 3.6 DP Capability Analysis and DP Footprints 3.6.1 DP Capability Analysis Detailed explanation and description of DP capability analysis are given in Specification for DP capability plots (IMCA M 140).
The calculated station keeping capabilities which are provided by the DP capability analysis should be supplemented by real time measurements and observations.
These real time observations and measurements are used to develop DP footprint plots.
DP footprint plots measure the vessel’s real station keeping performance (accuracy) in specific equipment configurators and environmental conditions.
They determine the vessel’s actual position keeping ability in various thruster configurations and environmental conditions and can be used for comparison with DP capability plots.
TMSA KPI 5.1.2 requires that comprehensive procedures to ensure safe navigation are in place.
These procedures may include: • Actions upon encountering adverse weather... • Supporting checklists.
IMO: ISM Code 7.
The Company should establish procedures, plans and instructions, including checklists as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the personnel, ship and protection of the environment.
The various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.
IMO: MSC.1/Circ.1580 Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems 3.4 DP control system 3.4.2 Computers .4 For equipment classes 2 and 3, the DP control system should include a software function, normally known as "consequence analysis", which continuously verifies that the vessel will remain in position even if the worst -case failure occurs.
This analysis should verify that the thrusters, propellers and rudders (if included under DP control) that remain in operation after the worst -case failure can generate the same resultant thruster force and moment as required before the failure.
The consequence analysis should provide an alarm if the occurrence of a worst -case failure were to lead to a loss of position and/or heading due to insufficient thrust for the prevailing environmental conditions (e.g., wind, waves, current, etc.).
For operations which will take a long time to safely terminate, the consequence analysis should include a function which simulates the remaining thrust and power after the worst -case failure, based on input of the environmental conditions. 4 Operational requirements 4.5 DP capability polar plots should be produced to demonstrate position keeping capacity for fully operational and post worst- case single failure conditions.
The capability plots should represent the environmental conditions in the area of operation and the mission-specific operational condition of the vessel. 4.6 The following checklists, test procedures, trials and instruct ions should be incorporated into the vessel- specific DP operations manuals: 1. location checklist; 2. watchkeeping checklist; 3.
DP operating instructions; 4. annual tests and procedures; 5. initial and periodical (5-year) tests and procedures; 6. examples of tests and proc edures after modifications and non-conformities; 7. blackout recovery procedure; 8. list of critical components; 9. examples of operating modes; 10. decision support tools such as ASOG; and 11. capability plots.
The vessel operator should have developed comprehensive procedures for DP operations contained within a DP operations manual.
Procedures should include: • DP location checklists and watchkeeping checklists. • DP operating instructions. • Risk assessment reviews. • Guidance on the use of: o DP footprints. o Consequence analysis. • Activity specific operating guidelines (ASOG).
Activity specific operating guidelines should include, for example, direction on: • The number of generators to be online. • Increasing the power output of generators that are already online. • Policy on standby generators.
Risk assessment reviews should reflect changes in operating locations, position reference sensors and/or Field Operations Manuals.
['Sight and review: o DP operations manual. o Completed DP location checklists and watchkeeping checklists. o Hard copy capability plots. o DP footprint records. o DP operations risk assessments.', 'Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the contents of the DP operations manual, including: o Capability plots. o DP footprints. o Consequence analysis. o Activity specific operational guidelines (ASOG).
Expected Evidence', 'DP operations manual.', 'Completed DP location checklists and watchkeeping checklist s.', 'Hard copy capability plots.', 'DP footprint records.', 'DP operations risk assessments.
Potential Grounds for a']
Industry Guidance OCIMF Guidelines for Offshore Tanker Operations 8.21.5 Field oper ations manual Field -specific operations manuals can provide the main procedures controlling cargo transfer operations across the field.
Such manuals can address all terminals within a field or location and can incorporate both field operations procedures and regulations information.
The field operations manual should include the following information: • A summary of field position, field layout and offshore terminal information including plans of cargo transfer configurations and appropriate photographs, contact numbers, call signs and communications channels for both operational and emergency use. • Description of cargo transfer equipment on each offshore terminal. • Step by step plan covering the entire operation in-field. • Description of standard and occasional joint operations including cargo transfer rates, line flushing, etc. • Particulars of all tankers nominated for regular cargo transfer operations at that field. • Tendering and accepting Notice of Readiness (NOR) and any special requirements for cargo quality, bills of lading and cargo calculations. • Speed reduction sequence and limits on approaching offshore terminal. • Operational limits and executive actions on exceeding limits. • ESD systems and executive actions at each ESD level, both for the offshore terminal ESD system and any joint cargo transfer ESD system. • Detailed checklists for the offshore terminal covering each stage of pre-transfer activities, monitoring and preparations for conventional tanker approach, hose and hawser connection, cargo transfer, conventional tanker disconnection and post transfer checking of systems and equipment. • Detailed checklists for each type of conventional tanker covering field -specific actions and requirements not covered by the conventional tanker’s own detailed checklists. • Emergency responsibilities and procedures.
This section of the field operations manual should be prepared jointly between the field management team responsible for running the terminal and offtake tanker’s technical operators to ensure that there are no gaps or overlaps in cover.
Some field managers may address emergency procedures by a separate bridging document or emergency response manual. within the manual.
This overview may be used by conventional tanker Masters to quickly obtain key information on the offshore terminal and cargo transfer operations. • A station keeping sector limits diagram giving key operational and station keeping limits and key communications channels.
This information may be on a single sheet suitable for posting on the conventional tanker bridge for immediate information. • FSOG which list the reporting requirements for the field. • References to the ISPS Security Plan and promulgation of security level for each terminal. 8.21.6 Field Specific Operating Guidelines FSOG help to ensure effective interaction between the offshore terminal and conventional tanker.
Development of the FSOG should be undertaken by the offshore terminal operator.
Ownership of the FSOG lies with the offshore terminal and demonstrates specific requirements for cargo transfers at that field.
The FSOG should be included in the field operations manual. 9.3.2 Communications As with conventional tankers, for most marine related operations, the primary means of communication between terminal, DP bow loading tanker and other vessels will be UHF or VHF radio.
UHF radio is recommended as the means of communication between offshore terminals, off take tankers and support vessels.
Private UHF channels are subject to less interference than public VHF channels.
VHF signals can be blocked by the large amount of steel on F(P)SOs.
Other systems used at offshore fields, e.g., trunking radio systems, can be used if the terminal provides the offtake tanker with a portable station. 9.7 Pre -transfer conference On completion of mooring and hose connection, the F(P)SO OIM or CRO and the DP bow loading tanker Master must agree cargo transfer procedures by radio and confirm any email document transfers before starting the cargo transfer.
Pre -transfer conference documentation should include: • Communications methods and procedures, including periodic prescribed communications checks.
TMSA KPI 1A.2.3 requires that relevant reference documents are provided as a supplement to the SMS both onboard and ashore.
Reference documents may include regulatory publications and industry guidelines.
The company has a procedure for maintaining the most up-to -date editions in all locat ions.
IMO: ISM Code 11.1 The Company should establish and maintain procedures to control all documents and data which are relevant to the SMS. 11.2 The Company should ensure that: 1. valid documents are available at all relevant locations; 2. changes to documents are reviewed and approved by authorized personnel; and 3. obsolete documents are promptly removed.
The vessel operator should have developed procedures to ensure that the most up-to -date editions of the field operations manuals are on board for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.
The Master and officers should be familiar with the content of these manuals, including Field Specific Operating Guidelines (FSOG) and contact numbers, call signs and communications channel s for both operational and emergency use.
['Sight, and where necessary review, the company procedures to ensure that the most up', 'to', 'date editions of the field operations manuals are on board for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.', 'Sight the field operations manuals for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.', 'Sight the records of the regular communication checks with terminal installations as required by Field Specific Operating Guidelines (FSOG).', 'Interview the accompanying officer to verify their familiarity with the content of the manuals, including FSOG and contact numbers, call s igns and communications channels for both operational and emergency use.
Expected Evidence', 'Company procedures to ensure that the most up', 'to', 'date editions of the field operations manuals are on board for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.', 'Field operations manuals for each offshore terminal to which the vessel trades.', 'Records of the regular communication checks with terminal installations as required by Field Specific Operating Guidelines (FSOG).
Potential Grounds for a']