Confirms a ship-specific Polar Water Operational Manual is carried onboard as required by Polar Code Part I-A Ch. 2, tailored to this vessel's structure, machinery, and equipment rather than a generic template
Establishes the PWOM cross-references the operational limitations on the Polar Ship Certificate (ice type/concentration, minimum temperature) in terms the bridge team can apply in real time
Checks that officers can locate specific PWOM guidance for a scenario, such as loss of propulsion in ice or an unplanned entry into ice exceeding the certified limitation
Verifies the manual is reviewed and updated after any modification affecting polar capability, such as a machinery change or structural repair
MasterChief Officer2nd Officer
What the Inspector Expects
Confirms the vessel applies IMO's Polar Operational Limit Assessment Risk Indexing System (POLARIS) methodology, combining the ship's ice-class risk index values with the ice type/concentration read from current ice charts
Establishes officers understand what a negative Risk Index Outcome (RIO) means operationally — elevated risk requiring the Master's special consideration, versus a RIO below the operational limit meaning the transit should not proceed as planned
Checks that the risk assessment is a documented, ship-specific calculation rather than a general statement that ice conditions were assessed
Verifies the assessment is repeated as ice conditions change during the transit, not performed once before departure and forgotten
MasterChief Officer2nd Officer
What the Inspector Expects
Confirms voyage planning through ice-affected waters incorporates the Polar Code's additional planning requirements under Part I-A Ch. 11, beyond standard SOLAS V/34 passage planning
Establishes recognized ice information sources are used, such as national ice services, satellite-derived ice charts, or a routing provider's forecast, and their age/currency is checked before use
Checks that the intended track accounts for known ice edge movement and forecast ice drift, with alternative routing available if conditions worsen
Verifies the passage plan identifies contingency actions if actual ice conditions differ materially from forecast
MasterChief Officer2nd Officer
What the Inspector Expects
Establishes the passage plan identifies pre-determined decision points, or points of no return, beyond which continuing becomes the safer option than reversing course, consistent with Polar Code voyage-planning intent under Part I-A Ch. 11
Confirms objective trigger criteria exist, such as RIO dropping below the operational limit, fuel/endurance reserves, deteriorating visibility, or confirmed heavier ice than forecast, rather than a subjective judgment made in the moment
Checks that the Master and OOWs on watch during the ice transit all know where the current point of no return is and what the abort criteria are before the ship reaches it
Verifies contingency plans exist for what happens after an abort decision, including alternate anchorage, return route, and fuel/endurance to execute it
MasterChief Officer2nd Officer
What the Inspector Expects
Confirms compliance with STCW Reg V/4 and STCW Code Section A-V/4, which set mandatory minimum training for bridge officers serving aboard vessels that enter polar waters
Establishes the distinction between Basic Polar Water training, required for the Master, Chief Officer and watchkeepers of any vessel entering polar waters covered by the Polar Code, and Advanced Polar Water training, required for the Master and Chief Officer of any ship trading into Category A or B waters
Checks that the level of training held, basic or advanced, matches the vessel's actual Polar Ship Certificate category and operating area
Verifies certificates are current and, where the Administration requires periodic refresher training, that this has been completed
MasterChief Officer2nd Officer
What the Inspector Expects
Establishes the company's policy for engaging an ice advisor or ice pilot when the Master's own polar experience, the vessel's ice class, or the forecast ice severity warrant additional expertise, since the Polar Code itself does not mandate one in every case
Confirms that when an ice advisor is aboard, their role, authority, and communication protocol with the Master are defined in advance, with command authority and responsibility remaining with the Master
Checks that the ice advisor is genuinely incorporated into passage planning and bridge team briefings, not treated as a passenger consulted informally
Verifies a handover/briefing occurs between the ice advisor and bridge watchkeepers at each watch change during the ice transit
MasterChief Officer
What the Inspector Expects
Confirms speed in ice is reduced and continually reassessed against ice type/concentration and the ship's ice-class limitations, rather than held at a fixed passage speed regardless of conditions
Establishes a clear company/bridge policy against deliberate ramming or backing-and-ramming manoeuvres on a non-icebreaking hull, given the structural risk this poses to a ship not designed for it
Checks understanding of icebreaker escort protocol — agreed following distance, a dedicated VHF working channel, and the convoy/station-keeping instructions issued by the icebreaker's master, since falling too far back risks the broken channel re-freezing
Verifies contingency actions are known if contact with the escorting icebreaker is lost or the ship becomes beset
MasterChief Officer2nd Officer
What the Inspector Expects
Confirms a documented winterization program covers heat tracing of exposed piping/instrumentation, protection of deck machinery such as the windlass, mooring winches, and valve actuators from freezing, and prevention of ballast tank freezing in way of the waterline
Establishes accommodation and machinery space heating is adequate and monitored, since crew habitability directly affects safe operation in sustained low temperature
Checks that de-icing equipment, such as mallets, wooden or plastic beaters, or steam lances, is provisioned, positioned for practical use, and crew are briefed on manual de-icing procedures
Verifies the vessel has a procedure for monitoring topside ice accretion and understands the stability impact, including when accumulated ice requires active removal rather than being left to melt
MasterChief OfficerBosun
What the Inspector Expects
Confirms a procedure exists for clearing or preventing ice blockage of sea chests, including use of a recirculation line from the cooling system to keep the sea chest ice-free, per the machinery installation requirements of Polar Code Part I-A Ch. 6
Establishes fuel and lubricating oil arrangements account for low ambient temperature — cold-flow properties, pour point margins, and any heating/tracing needed to keep fuel usable
Checks awareness of which cooling water strategy is in use, such as low sea suction, recirculation, or a dedicated ice-condition sea chest, and why it's matched to the vessel's actual arrangement
Verifies a post-transit inspection procedure for hull plating, especially at the waterline/ice belt, and propeller/rudder for ice-contact damage, with a clear reporting path if damage is found
Chief Engineer2nd Engineer3rd Engineer
What the Inspector Expects
Establishes crew awareness that mooring lines and wires accumulate ice and take on significant added weight and reduced flexibility, changing safe handling procedures and increasing snap-back risk
Confirms windlass and mooring winch brakes are checked for ice interference and that brake holding capacity is understood to be potentially reduced by ice-stiffened line, not assumed unchanged from normal conditions
Checks that anchor and cable are inspected and cleared of ice before letting go or heaving in, avoiding damage to the windlass or an uncontrolled cable run
Verifies a procedure exists for periodically clearing ice from lines and wires already made fast, rather than leaving them to build up ice over an extended freezing-weather port stay
Chief OfficerBosunAble Seaman
What the Inspector Expects
Confirms immersion suits and other survival equipment carried are suitable for the water/air temperatures actually expected on the polar transit, not just the baseline thermal protection assumed for temperate trading
Establishes liferafts intended for use in the operating area are winterized, with appropriate hydrostatic release/inflation performance and survival pack contents for low temperature, per Polar Code life-saving appliance requirements
Checks the bridge team's understanding of GMDSS Sea Area A4 limitations at high latitudes, where INMARSAT coverage becomes unreliable and communication instead depends on HF and Cospas-Sarsat, and that the equipment fitted actually supports this
Verifies drills or briefings specifically address cold-water survival time expectations and realistic rescue timelines given the communication constraints